Allan S. Krass

II. Neutrino Production of Baryons and Mesons

I. Radiative Corrections to Electron-proton Scattering

Deterrence and Its Contradictions

The United States has committed itself to an unprecedented number and variety of arms control and nonproliferation obligations in the past decade. At least ten major new agreements have been signed since 1986, and some of them have now been in force for several years. After a brief review of Cold War arms control and the lessons to be learned from it, the book surveys the commitments the United States has made during the past decade across the full spectrum of arms control, including nuclear, conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. It describes the bureaucratic structure the United States has created to implement its own commitments and to verify that other countries are complying with theirs. The book then analyzes the costs and benefits of the new regimes, the persistent problems encountered in managing them, and the causes and appropriate responses to incidents of noncompliance. It concludes with an argument for continued U.S. leadership in international arms control.

The Challenge of Leadership

The United States and Arms Control

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Boelie Elzen

Peter Boskma

Wim A. Smit

Originally published in 1983, this book presents both the technical and political information necessary to evaluate the emerging threat to world security posed by recent advances in uranium enrichment technology. Uranium enrichment has played a relatively quiet but important role in the history of efforts by a number of nations to acquire nuclear weapons and by a number of others to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For many years the uranium enrichment industry was dominated by a single method, gaseous diffusion, which was technically complex, extremely capital-intensive, and highly inefficient in its use of energy. As long as this remained true, only the richest and most technically advanced nations could afford to pursue the enrichment route to weapon acquisition. But during the 1970s this situation changed dramatically. Several new and far more accessible enrichment techniques were developed, stimulated largely by the anticipation of a rapidly growing demand for enrichment services by the world-wide nuclear power industry. This proliferation of new techniques, coupled with the subsequent contraction of the commercial market for enriched uranium, has created a situation in which uranium enrichment technology might well become the most important contributor to further nuclear weapon proliferation. Some of the issues addressed in this book are: A technical analysis of the most important enrichment techniques in a form that is relevant to analysis of proliferation risks; A detailed projection of the world demand for uranium enrichment services; A summary and critique of present institutional non-proliferation arrangements in the world enrichment industry, and An identification of the states most likely to pursue the enrichment route to acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation

Stockholm International Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Originally published in 1985, the level of anxiety and suspicion between the USA and the USSR had rarely been higher. Many advocates of arms control believed that effective verification would reduce tensions and lessen the risk of war. This book analyses the two main issues of verification. One is technological: what are the present capabilities of various verification techniques and what is their potential? The devices and methods currently employed by the two major nuclear powers and by international organizations to monitor the compliance of states with arms control or disarmament treaties are examined. The second issue is political: how do US and Soviet approaches compare, what are the roles of domestic and bureaucratic politics, and on what criteria can a workable standard of adequacy be based? In short, how much is enough? Although the study concludes that a number of significant arms control measures can already be adequately verified, modern weapons are becoming more mobile and it is becoming easier to conceal them. There is a danger that the ability to hide weapons will outstrip the ability to find them. Verification cannot promise to detect all violations; a workable standard of adequacy in verification must derive from the ability to detect militarily significant violations.

How Much is Enough?

Verification

Allan S. Krass

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