Alvin E. Roth

A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role. If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what. Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.

The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design

Who Gets What -- and Why

LA NUEVA ECONOMÍA DEL DISEÑO DE MERCADOS

QUIÉN OBTIENE QUÉ Y POR QUÉ

O ganhador do prêmio Nobel de economia Alvin E. Roth revela as regras que regem os mercados que nos cercam. Com uma linguagem acessível e exemplos universais, Alvin Roth explica a ciência que rege os mercados que não utilizam somente dinheiro em suas transações. Tomando como base as pesquisas e projetos que lhe renderam o prêmio Nobel de economia em 2012, Roth é capaz de transformar a complexa teoria de jogos e desenho de mercados em conceitos fáceis de serem compreendidos. Transplantes de órgãos, casamentos, ofertas de emprego e empresas como Amazon, Uber e Airbnb são alguns dos exemplos desmitificados pelo autor. Um livro essencial que ajuda a entender as transformações imprevisíveis que nos cercam e nos prepara para as novas oportunidades de mercado que podem surgir a qualquer momento.

A nova economia das combinações e do desenho de mercado

Como funcionam os mercados

John H. Kagel

This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, with the remaining chapters providing surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making. The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that wherever possible, emphasis is on series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume--Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E. Roth, and Shyam Sunder--adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate.

The Handbook of Experimental Economics

Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor

Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann

A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

Two-Sided Matching

Nir Vulkan

Zvika Neeman

Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges.

The Handbook of Market Design

Wenn’s nicht um Geld geht: Ein Nobelpreisträger zeigt, wie wir Märkte für uns nutzen können Wie finden Eltern die richtige Schule für ihr Kind? Oder Jobsuchende den richtigen Arbeitgeber – und umgekehrt? Wie finden Nierenkranke den richtigen Organspender? Und Singles den richtigen Partner? Nobelpreisträger Alvin Roth, einer der weltweit führenden Wirtschaftswissenschaftler, zeigt, was geschieht, wenn wir etwas wollen, das für Geld allein nicht zu kriegen ist – und wie wir unsere Ziele erreichen können. Alvin E. Roth, Spieltheoretiker, Miterfi nder des »Market Designs« und Nobelpreisträger für Wirtschaft 2012, widmet sich in seinem Buch einem Thema, das uns täglich begegnet, ohne dass wir uns dessen bewusst sind: den Märkten, die sich kaum oder gar nicht über Preise regeln lassen – sondern über den Abgleich von Interessen, das optimale Verkuppeln von Wünschen zur Zufriedenheit aller. An vielen konkreten Beispielen aus Beruf und Alltag, von der Berufswahl bis zur Parkplatzsuche, vom Hauskauf über die Online-Partnervermittlung bis zur Organspende zeigt er, wie die verschiedenen Märkte funktionieren, die unser Leben bestimmen (ob wir wollen oder nicht) – und wie wir lernen können, sie zu unseren Gunsten zu nutzen

Bildung, Jobs und Partnerwahl: Wie Märkte funktionieren

Wer kriegt was - und warum?

Composed in honour of the sixty-fifth birthday of Lloyd Shapley, this volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper. Each of the twenty essays concerns some aspect of the Shapley value. Three of the chapters are reprints of the 'ancestral' papers: Chapter 2 is Shapley's original 1953 paper defining the value; Chapter 3 is the 1954 paper by Shapley and Shubik applying the value to voting models; and chapter 19 is Shapley's 1969 paper defining a value for games without transferable utility. The other seventeen chapters were contributed especially for this volume. The first chapter introduces the subject and the other essays in the volume, and contains a brief account of a few of Shapley's other major contributions to game theory. The other chapters cover the reformulations, interpretations and generalizations that have been inspired by the Shapley value, and its applications to the study of coalition formulation, to the organization of large markets, to problems of cost allocation, and to the study of games in which utility is not transferable.

Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley

The Shapley Value

An indispensable survey of new developments and results in experimental economics When The Handbook of Experimental Economics first came out in 1995, the notion of economists conducting lab experiments to generate data was relatively new. Since then, the field has exploded. This second volume of the Handbook covers some of the most exciting new growth areas in experimental economics, presents the latest results and experimental methods, and identifies promising new directions for future research. Featuring contributions by leading practitioners, the Handbook describes experiments in macroeconomics, charitable giving, neuroeconomics, other-regarding preferences, market design, political economy, subject population effects, gender effects, auctions, and learning and the economics of small decisions. Contributors focus on key developments and report on experiments, highlighting the dialogue between experimenters and theorists. While most of the experiments consist of laboratory studies, the book also includes several chapters that report extensively on field experiments related to the subject area studied. Covers exciting new growth areas in experimental economics Features contributions by leading experts Describes experiments in macroeconomics, charitable giving, neuroeconomics, market design, political economy, gender effects, auctions, and more Highlights the dialogue by experimenters with theorists and each other Includes several chapters covering field experiments related to the subject area studied

The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2

Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions.

This Handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors.

Alvin E. Roth

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