Barton Whaley

Turnabout and Deception combines two of spymaster Barton Whaley's most potent analyses of the craft: Turnabout: Crafting the Double-Cross and When Deception Fails: The Theory of Outs. Each examination delves into extensive case studies to establish not only foundational understandings of essential espionage principals, but also creates guidance for their practical application on both individual and governmental scales. Deception is a basic tactic used by allies and enemies alike, but when both protagonist and antagonist ply the same trade, it is the master of the double-cross who comes out the victor. Turnabout and Deception examines how to turn the tables on an opponent and use their own deception against them. Through thirty-eight case studies, this monograph dissects the double-cross to reveal the psychological battle of wits at its core. No matter how well crafted, however, there is always a chance that a deception will fail. But failure is not the end of a deception, and even failed deception operations can yield results. Turnabout and Deception pores over sixty more case studies to determine why a deception will fail, steps to prevent a failed operation, and how to turn that failure into a success.

Crafting the Double-Cross and the Theory of Outs

Turnabout and Deception

Hy Rothstein

It is said that deception among people in a civilized society is something to be loathed even though it seems to be part of human nature; but deception in war is a virtue. Properly designed and executed, stratagems reduce the horrific costs of war. This book is a comprehensive collection of classic articles on deception, hand-picked and expertly introduced by well-known experts on military deception. The purpose of this book is to set in motion a renaissance for using deception as an instrument of statecraft. The various sections are designed to cumulatively provide sufficient breadth and depth on the subject to satisfy both the novice as well as the expert. Packed with expert commentary, interesting background information, and original readings, this book provides the reader with sufficient knowledge to pursue General Eisenhower’s vision for the proper role of deception in support of the national interest.

The Art and Science of Military Deception

Some cultures are clearly more deceptive than others but only during any given slice of time. No single culture has excelled in deceptiveness throughout its history. While the Chinese did rise to the highest level of military deviousness during the time of Sun Tzu (c.350 BC), they had low levels before Master Sun, and afterwards largely lost it during three long periods, only to regain it each time. The most recent Chinese loss was when they fell to the lowest level from the late 1700s until being conquered in 1948 by the stratagemic Chinese Communists (PLA). Thence the PLA has displayed high if not the highest levels of deceptiveness, although there are indications that, beginning in 2002, they are again on the upswing. The levels of guilefulness at any given time can be quite different across the major disciplines of military, domestic politics, foreign diplomacy, and commercial business. Perceived practical considerations of greed and survival do sometimes override religious, moral, or ethical factors to produce deceptive behavior. The levels of guilefulness at any given point in time between any two contemporary armed entities (nations, insurgents, or terrorists) are apt to be asymmetric. Deception sophistication is independent of technological change. Within each culture deception varies widely in its levels of sophistication. High, medium, and low levels were found in every culture at different times and regardless of its level of technology. The reason? Because deception is a mind game, it is played only between or among humans. And this condition will remain as long as machines such as computers lack artificial intelligence. Because deception is a mind game, the variations in guilefulness between opposing individuals or groups can be crucial in deciding the victor in combat.

Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners

Practise to Deceive

John Bowyer Bell

Cheating and deception are terms often used but rarely defined. They summon up unpleasant connotations; even those deeply involved with cheating and deception rationalize why they have been driven to it. Particularly for Americans and much of Western civilization, official cheating, government duplicity, cheating as policy, and conscious, contrived deception, are all unacceptable except as a last resort in response to threat of extinction. As a distasteful tool, deception is rarely used to achieve national interests, unless in relation to the deployment of military force. As an area of study, it has by and large been ignored. Intrigued by attitudes toward cheating and deception, the authors decided to analyze its roots, structure, and process. They asked fundamental questions: are there categories of deception, general steps in the process of deception, and ways to evaluate its results across time and in different modes? The book that results is a typology of kinds of deception, beginning with military deception, but extending into other categories and stages. In his introduction to this new edition, Bell outlines how the book came to be written, describes the mixed emotions toward the subject displayed by govenmental and nongovernmental funding sources, and speculates about its critical and commercial reception. He discusses widespread new interest in the subject, the research that has been undertaken since this book was first published, and its limitations. This book provides a general overview of this complex subject, creating a framework for analysis of specific instances of cheating or deception. It will be of particular interest to political scientists, those interested in military affairs and strategy, and psychologists. The general reader will find the book written with a light touch, drawing examples of cheating and deception in the pursuit of love and money. The specialist reader will be intrigued by its broad-ranging examples drawn from policy and politics, wars and rumors of wars.

Barton Whaley

About

Books

Join the club