John Dumbrell

David M. Barrett

Including two post-Cold War case studies on foreign policy in Somalia and Northern Ireland, this book seeks to explain the shaping of US diplomacy through a variety of windows. The structures and traditions which went into it are examined in detail, and the conflicts and interactions between various governmental institutions are explored. The tensions between US expansive internationalism and a native isolationism is also looked at and helps to form an analysis of the relationship between process and substance in foreign policy. Another major theme of the book is the relationship between the making of policy and democratic practices. Distributed by St. Martin's Press. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

The Making of US Foreign Policy

Lyndon Johnson, when it comes to his role in the Vietnam war, is popularly portrayed as an irrational hawkish leader who bullied his advisers and refused to solicit a wide range of opinions. That depiction, David Barrett, argues, is simplistic and far from accurate.

Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers

Uncertain Warriors

Max Holland

In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, questions persisted about how the potential cataclysm had been allowed to develop. A subsequent congressional investigation focused on what came to be known as the “photo gap”: five weeks during which intelligence-gathering flights over Cuba had been attenuated. In Blind over Cuba, David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administration’s handling of the Soviet Union’s surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than epitomizing it as a masterpiece of crisis management by policy makers and the administration, Barrett and Holland make the case that the affair was, in fact, a close call stemming directly from decisions made in a climate of deep distrust between key administration officials and the intelligence community. Because of White House and State Department fears of “another U-2 incident” (the infamous 1960 Soviet downing of an American U-2 spy plane), the CIA was not permitted to send surveillance aircraft on prolonged flights over Cuban airspace for many weeks, from late August through early October. Events proved that this was precisely the time when the Soviets were secretly deploying missiles in Cuba. When Director of Central Intelligence John McCone forcefully pointed out that this decision had led to a dangerous void in intelligence collection, the president authorized one U-2 flight directly over western Cuba—thereby averting disaster, as the surveillance detected the Soviet missiles shortly before they became operational. The Kennedy administration recognized that their failure to gather intelligence was politically explosive, and their subsequent efforts to influence the perception of events form the focus for this study. Using recently declassified documents, secondary materials, and interviews with several key participants, Barrett and Holland weave a story of intra-agency conflict, suspicion, and discord that undermined intelligence-gathering, adversely affected internal postmortems conducted after the crisis peaked, and resulted in keeping Congress and the public in the dark about what really happened. Fifty years after the crisis that brought the superpowers to the brink, Blind over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis offers a new chapter in our understanding of that pivotal event, the tensions inside the US government during the cold war, and the obstacles Congress faces when conducting an investigation of the executive branch.

The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis

Blind over Cuba

A historical perspective for current debates in Congress and beyond concerning the CIA's recent failures and ultimate fate is offered in this account of relations between America's spymasters and Capitol Hill.

David M. Barrett

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