David T. Wasserman

David Benatar

In this volume, two authors debate the ethics of procreation. One argues for the anti-natalist view that procreation is never morally permissible. In support of that conclusion he advances a number of arguments. In the second half of the book, the second author identifies a variety of moderate pro-natalist positions, which all see procreation as sometimes permissible but never required.

Is it Wrong to Reproduce?

Debating Procreation

This book offers the first study of indigent criminal appellate representation in the United States. Using New York City as a research model, it explores the organizational, tactical, and ethical challenges of providing zealous advocacy for every convicted indigent wishing to appeal. The author, a former staff attorney with New York's Legal Aid Society, examines the impact of the Supreme Court's Douglas decision on appellate courts and representation; presents an empirical study of criminal appeals in New York; and discusses the implications of this research for indigent appellate defense.

Representing Indigent Defendants on Appeal

A Sword for the Convicted

Anita Silvers

Professor of Philosophy Anita Silvers, Ph.D.

Mary Briody Mahowald

Mary B. Mahowald

Director of Research David Wasserman

How should we respond to individuals with disabilities? What does it mean to be disabled? Over fifty million Americans, from neonates to the fragile elderly, are disabled. Some people say they have the right to full social participation, while others repudiate such claims as delusive or dangerous. In this compelling book, three experts in ethics, medicine, and the law address pressing disability questions in bioethics and public policy. Anita Silvers, David Wasserman, and Mary B. Mahowald test important theories of justice by bringing them to bear on subjects of concern in a wide variety of disciplines dealing with disability. They do so in the light of recent advances in feminist, minority, and cultural studies, and of the groundbreaking Americans with Disabilities Act. Visit our website for sample chapters!

Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy

Disability, Difference, Discrimination

Melinda A. Roberts

Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 1 Purpose of this Collection What are our obligations with respect to persons who have not yet, and may not ever, come into existence? Few of us believe that we can wrong those whom we leave out of existence altogether—that is, merely possible persons. We may think as well that the directive to be “fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth” 1 does not hold up to close scrutiny. How can it be wrong to decline to bring ever more people into existence? At the same time, we think we are clearly ob- gated to treat future persons—persons who don’t yet but will exist—in accordance with certain stringent standards. Bringing a person into an existence that is truly awful—not worth having—can be wrong, and so can bringing a person into an existence that is worth having when we had the alternative of bringing that same person into an existence that is substantially better. We may think as well that our obligations with respect to future persons are triggered well before the point at which those persons commence their existence. We think it would be wrong, for example, to choose today to turn the Earth of the future into a miserable place even if the victims of that choice do not yet exist.

Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem

Harming Future Persons

David T. Wasserman

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