Dominic D. P. Johnson

"A very timely book."—Anne-Marie Slaughter, CEO of New America How cognitive biases can guide good decision making in politics and international relations A widespread assumption in political science and international relations is that cognitive biases—quirks of the brain we all share as human beings—are detrimental and responsible for policy failures, disasters, and wars. In Strategic Instincts, Dominic Johnson challenges this assumption, explaining that these nonrational behaviors can actually support favorable results in international politics and contribute to political and strategic success. By studying past examples, he considers the ways that cognitive biases act as “strategic instincts,” lending a competitive edge in policy decisions, especially under conditions of unpredictability and imperfect information. Drawing from evolutionary theory and behavioral sciences, Johnson looks at three influential cognitive biases—overconfidence, the fundamental attribution error, and in-group/out-group bias. He then examines the advantageous as well as the detrimental effects of these biases through historical case studies of the American Revolution, the Munich Crisis, and the Pacific campaign in World War II. He acknowledges the dark side of biases—when confidence becomes hubris, when attribution errors become paranoia, and when group bias becomes prejudice. Ultimately, Johnson makes a case for a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of cognitive biases and argues that in the complex world of international relations, strategic instincts can, in the right context, guide better performance. Strategic Instincts shows how an evolutionary perspective can offer the crucial next step in bringing psychological insights to bear on foundational questions in international politics.

The Adaptive Advantages of Cognitive Biases in International Politics

Strategic Instincts

Opponents rarely go to war without thinking they can win--and clearly, one side must be wrong. This conundrum lies at the heart of the so-called "war puzzle": rational states should agree on their differences in power and thus not fight. But as Dominic Johnson argues in "Overconfidence and War," states are no more rational than people, who are susceptible to exaggerated ideas of their own virtue, of their ability to control events, and of the future. By looking at this bias--called "positive illusions"--as it figures in evolutionary biology, psychology, and the politics of international conflict, this book offers compelling insights into why states wage war. Johnson traces the effects of positive illusions on four turning points in twentieth-century history: two that erupted into war (World War I and Vietnam); and two that did not (the Munich crisis and the Cuban missile crisis). Examining the two wars, he shows how positive illusions have filtered into politics, causing leaders to overestimate themselves and underestimate their adversaries--and to resort to violence to settle a conflict against unreasonable odds. In the Munich and Cuban missile crises, he shows how lessening positive illusions may allow leaders to pursue peaceful solutions. The human tendency toward overconfidence may have been favored by natural selection throughout our evolutionary history because of the advantages it conferred--heightening combat performance or improving one's ability to bluff an opponent. And yet, as this book suggests--and as the recent conflict in Iraq bears out--in the modern world the consequences of this evolutionary legacy are potentially deadly.

OVERCONFIDENCE AND WAR

How cognitive biases can guide good decision making in politics and international relations A widespread assumption in political science and international relations is that cognitive biases—quirks of the brain we all share as human beings—are detrimental and responsible for policy failures, disasters, and wars. In Strategic Instincts, Dominic Johnson challenges this assumption, explaining that these nonrational behaviors can actually support favorable results in international politics and contribute to political and strategic success. By studying past examples, he considers the ways that cognitive biases act as “strategic instincts,” lending a competitive edge in policy decisions, especially under conditions of unpredictability and imperfect information. Drawing from evolutionary theory and behavioral sciences, Johnson looks at three influential cognitive biases—overconfidence, the fundamental attribution error, and in-group/out-group bias. He then examines the advantageous as well as the detrimental effects of these biases through historical case studies of the American Revolution, the Munich Crisis, and the Pacific campaign in World War II. He acknowledges the dark side of biases—when confidence becomes hubris, when attribution errors become paranoia, and when group bias becomes prejudice. Ultimately, Johnson makes a case for a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of cognitive biases and argues that in the complex world of international relations, strategic instincts can, in the right context, guide better performance. Strategic Instincts shows how an evolutionary perspective can offer the crucial next step in bringing psychological insights to bear on foundational questions in international politics.

Johnson

A study offers insights into why states wage war and traces the effects of human tendency toward overconfidence through two turning points that erupted into war and two that did not.

The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions

Overconfidence and War

"At the heart of much work in international relations is the attempt to understand why citizens and leaders act as they do-and over the last decade, a growing body of research has shown that the "rational choice theory" that has long guided this understanding is insufficient. People do not always behave rationally; instead, most of us have psychological biases that cause us to behave "irrationally." As political science has integrated this new behavioral research, the literature has tended to view such biases as source of errors or mistakes. Yet for other fields-most notably evolutionary biology-the same psychological biases are recognized as adaptive heuristics that evolved to improve our decision-making, not to undermine it. In this book, Johnson uses his cross-disciplinary training to push this evolutionary understanding of biases into the study of politics. Specifically, he asks: when and how can psychological biases cause or promote success in the realm of international relations? Johnson focuses on three of the most prominent psychological biases-overconfidence, the fundamental attribution error (the tendency to see others' actions as motivated by personality rather than the influence of external/situational factors) and in-group/out-group bias (favoring members of group one identifies with over those one does not). He outlines the scientific research on each bias, explores its adaptive advantages, and then gives detailed historical examples where the bias seems to have caused strategic advantages, focusing on the American Revolution (overconfidence), the UK and the appeasement of Hitler (fundamental attribution error) and the Pacific campaign in WW2 (group bias). He then circles back to acknowledge the "dark side" of biases when taken to the extreme, considering how confidence becomes hubris, the attribution error becomes paranoia and group bias becomes racism. Ultimately, Johnson argues that this evolutionary perspective is the crucial next step in bringing psychological insights to bear on the foundational questions in the field"--

Dominic D. P. Johnson

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