Paul Mulvey

Richard A. Young

Anil Arya

Jeffrey Duane Ford

Riad A. Ajami

Edward James Kane

John C. Fellingham

W. Wayne Talarzyk

Kwok-Wai Leung

Paul L. Sauer

Anthony Bown Sanders

Howard Jay Klein

Michael James Blaine

Murray Arnold Young

Charles L. Sterling

Haluk Unal

An Investigation of Group Social and Goal Processes and Performance

Perceived Free Riding in Groups

For optimal regulation, one size does not fit all. Differences in countries' informational and contracting environments (in the transparency of information, in protection for counterparties, and in political accountability), influence the design of their financial safety nets and their strategies for managing the breakdown of those nets.

Designing Financial Safety Nets to Fit Country Circumstances

G. Keong Leong

P. V. Balakrishnan

Patric H. Hendershott

Roger D. Blackwell

Jim Hutchison

Scott Snell

Howard J. Klein

Robert E. Widing

Basheer M. Khumawala

Michael D. Oliff

Sudir K. Chawla

Thomas Thibodeau

Key to Growth in Industrial and Consumer Markets

Consumer Trends and Demographics

Unrecognized and deferred losses at insured deposit institutions currently impair the capacity of the nation's principal deposit insurers (the FDIC and FSLIC) both to discipline failing institutions and to discipline or take over insolvent ones. These agencies' accrued but unreported losses far exceed their explicit financial resources. Moreover, their backlog of unresolved problem cases far exceeds the workload that their existing staffs can handle. What holds the deposit-institution system together is financial-market participants' so-far-unshakable faith that politicians and bureaucrats cannot afford to let the FDIC and FSLIC renege on the obligations that they and their predecessors have permitted these agencies to assume. Underlying this belief is a conjectural economic assessment of the strength and constancy of incentives that direct elected politicians to bail out politically sensitive enterprises. This paper addresses three tasks: (1) to clarify the defects in the information, monitoring, regulatory-response, and incentive sub-systems of federal deposit insurance that, by subsidizing institutional risk-taking, led so many deposit institutions and their insurers into economic insolvency; (2) to identify a generic mix of reforms that could in principle put the system right again; and (3) to explain how far proposals for reform that hold a place on the active legislative and regulatory agenda fall short of this ideal.

No Room for Weak Links in the Chain of Deposit Insurance Reform

Edward James Kane

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