Georg Northoff

An argument for a Copernican revolution in our consideration of mental features—a shift in which the world-brain problem supersedes the mind-body problem. Philosophers have long debated the mind-body problem—whether to attribute such mental features as consciousness to mind or to body. Meanwhile, neuroscientists search for empirical answers, seeking neural correlates for consciousness, self, and free will. In this book, Georg Northoff does not propose new solutions to the mind-body problem; instead, he questions the problem itself, arguing that it is an empirically, ontologically, and conceptually implausible way to address the existence and reality of mental features. We are better off, he contends, by addressing consciousness and other mental features in terms of the relationship between world and brain; philosophers should consider the world-brain problem rather than the mind-body problem. This calls for a Copernican shift in vantage point—from within the mind or brain to beyond the brain—in our consideration of mental features. Northoff, a neuroscientist, psychiatrist, and philosopher, explains that empirical evidence suggests that the brain's spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure are central to aligning and integrating the brain within the world. This spatiotemporal structure allows the brain to extend beyond itself into body and world, creating the “world-brain relation” that is central to mental features. Northoff makes his argument in empirical, ontological, and epistemic-methodological terms. He discusses current models of the brain and applies these models to recent data on neuronal features underlying consciousness and proposes the world-brain relation as the ontological predisposition for consciousness.

From the Mind–Body to the World–Brain Problem

The Spontaneous Brain

Niall W Duncan

Pengmin Qin

What the self is and where it comes from has been one of the great problems of philosophy for thousands of years. As science and medicine have progressed this question has moved to also become a central one in psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience. The advent of in vivo brain imaging has now allowed the scientific investigation of the self to progress further than ever. Many such imaging studies have indicated that brain structures along the cortical midline are particularly closely related to self-specific processing. This association between cortical midline structures (CMS) and self is reinforced by the involvement of these regions in other self-oriented processes, such as mind-wandering or stimulus valuation. Those midline regions involved in self- processing also overlap with another network, the default mode network, which shows high brain activity during the so-called resting state, indicating that there may be a special relationship between self-processing and intrinsic activity. Although such promising groundwork linking the self and CMS has been carried out, many questions remain. These include: what features of the midline regions lead to their apparent importance in self-processing? How can we appropriately account for confounding factors such as familiarity or task-effects in our experiments? How is the self-related to other features of the mind, such as consciousness? How is our methodology influencing our attempts to link the self and the brain? The purpose of this ebook is to address some of these questions, including opinions, perspectives, and hypotheses about the concept of the self, the relationship between CMS and the self, and the specific function of these brain regions in self-processing. It also includes original research papers describing EEG, fMRI, and behavioral experiments investigating different aspects of the self.

Why and How is the self related to the brain midline regions?

Dave J. Hayes

Andrew J. Greenshaw

Affective brain circuits underpin our moods and emotions. Appetitive and aversive stimuli from our exteroceptive and interoceptive worlds play a key role in the activity of these circuits, but we still do not know precisely how to characterize these so-called reward-related and aversion-related systems. Moreover, we do we yet understand how they interact anatomically or functionally. The aim of the current project was to gather some translational evidence to help clarify the role of such circuits. A multi-dimensional problem in its own right, the book contains 14 works from authors exploring these questions at many levels, from the cellular to the cognitive-behavioural, and from both experimental and conceptual viewpoints. The editorial which introduces the book provides brief summaries of each perspective (Hayes, Northoff, Greenshaw, 2015). While questions of how to accurately define affect- and emotion-related concepts at the psychological level are far from answered, here we have attempted to provide some insight into the brain-based underpinnings of such processes. The near future will undoubtedly involve making new inroads and will require the joint efforts of behavioural, brain-based, and philosophical perspectives to do so.

Reward- and aversion-related processing in the brain: translational evidence for separate and shared circuits

Matthew Walker

Robert Stickgold

David Mann

Allan N. Schore

Bessel A. Van Der Kolk

Grigoris Vaslamatzis

The book gathers some papers concerning the dialogue between neuroscience and psychoanalysis. Following the Introduction written by Georg Northoff, concerning the possibility of overcoming the highly impasse generating contraposition between localizationism and holism, G. Vaslamatzis deals with a “Framework for a new dialogue between psychoanalysis and neurosciences”. In this chapter the author describes three points of epistemological congruence: firstly, dualism is no longer a satisfactory solution; secondly, cautions for the centrality of interpretation (hermeneutics); and, thirdly, the self-criticism of neuroscientists. David W.Mann in his contribution “The mirror crack’d: dissociation and reflexivity in self and group phenomena” tries to show how reflexive processes generate each of three levels of the human system (self, relationships, group) and integrate them one to another, while dissociative processes tend throughout to pull them apart. Health and illness within the self, the relationship and the group can be understood as special states of the dynamic equilibria between these cohesive and dispersive trends. In “Sleep, memory and plasticity” Matthew P. Walker and Robert Stickgold outline a review of the researches following the discovery of rapid eye movement (REM) and non-REM (NREM) sleep, and specifically of those that began testing the hypothesis that sleep, or even specific stages of sleep, actively participated in the process of memory development. The last two chapters, “Clinical implications of neuroscience research in PTSD” by Bessel A. Van Der Kolk, and “Dysregulation of the right brain: a fundamental mechanism of traumatic attachment and the psychopathogenesis of PTSD” by Allan N. Schore, demonstrate how the psychopathology of traumatic conditions can be a fertile field of dialogue between neuroscience and psychoanalysis.

Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis

Cornelia Herbert

Thomas Ethofer

Andreas J. Fallgatter

Peter Walla

Language has long been considered independent from emotions. In the last few years however research has accumulated empirical evidence against this theoretical belief of a purely cognitive-based foundation of language. In particular, through research on emotional word processing it has been shown, that processing of emotional words activates emotional brain structures, elicits emotional facial expressions and modulates action tendencies of approach and avoidance, probably in a similar manner as processing of non-verbal emotional stimuli does. In addition, it has been shown that emotional content is already processed in the visual cortex in a facilitated manner which suggests that processing of emotional language content is able to circumvent in-depth semantic analysis. Yet, this is only one side of the coin. Very recent research putting words into context suggests that language may also construe emotions and that by studying word processing one can provide a window to one’s own feelings. All in all, the empirical observations support the thesis of a close relationship between language and emotions at the level of word meaning as a specific evolutionary achievement of the human species. As such, this relationship seems to be different from the one between emotions and speech, where emotional meaning is conveyed by nonverbal features of the voice. But what does this relationship between written words and emotions theoretically imply for the processing of emotional information? The present Research Topic and its related articles aim to provide answers to this question. This book comprises several experimental studies investigating the brain structures and the time course of emotional word processing. Included are studies examining the affective core dimensions underlying affective word processing and studies that show how these basic affective dimensions influence word processing in general as well as the interaction between words, feelings and (expressive) behavior. In addition, new impetus comes from studies that on the one hand investigate how task-, sublexical and intrapersonal factors influence emotional word processing and on the other hand extend emotional word processing to the domains of social context and self-related processing. Finally, future perspectives are outlined including research on emotion and language acquisition, culture and multilingualism. In summary, this textbook offers scientists from different disciplines insight into the neurophysiological, behavioral and subjective mechanisms underlying emotion and language interactions. It gives new impulses to existing theories on the embodiment of language and emotion and provides new ways of looking at emotion-cognition interactions.

The Janus-Face of Language: Where Are the Emotions in Words and the Words in Emotions?

Peter Hartwich

Heinz Böker

Ist die Psyche nichts als die neuronalen Prozesse im Gehirn? Müssen zentrale mentale Begriffe wie Selbst, Bewusstsein, Unbewusstsein, etc. durch neuronale Mechanismen erklärt werden und die Psychiatrie durch die Neurowissenschaften ersetzt werden? Unser Buch zeigt auf, dass mentale Prozesse und psychische Symptome bei psychiatrischen Erkrankungen wie Schizophrenie, Depression, etc. weder reine geistige noch nur neuronale Prozesse sind. Gehirn ist immer auch schon Umwelt; und es ist die Interaktion der Umwelt-Gehirn-Beziehung, in der psychische Phänomene inklusive ihrer Abnormitäten ihren neuropsychodynamischen Ursprung haben. Der Inhalt Neuropsychodynamische Grundlagen Neurosoziale Auffassung des Gehirns Psychoanalytische Konzepte und deren Weiterentwicklung Neuropsychodynamik psychischer Störungen Therapie auf neuropsychodynamischer Grundlage Neurosoziale und neuropsychodynamische Zukunftsperspektiven Die Herausgeber Prof. Dr. Heinz Böker, Psychiatrische Universitätsklinik Zürich, Zentrum für Depressionen, Angsterkrankungen und Psychotherapie, Zürich, Schweiz. Prof. Dr. Peter Hartwich, Städtische Kliniken Frankfurt am Main-Höchst, Klinik für Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie/Psychosomatik, Akademisches, Lehrkrankenhaus der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland. Prof. Dr. Dr. Georg Northoff, University of Ottawa, Institute of Mental Health Research, Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre, Ottawa/ON, Canada, Zhejang University, Hangzhou/China, Taipeh Medical University Taipeh/Taiwan.

Neuropsychodynamische Psychiatrie

"What is the mind?" "What is the relationship between brain and mind?" These are common questions. But "What is the brain?" is a rare question in both the neurosciences and philosophy. The reason for this may lie in the brain itself: Is there a "brain problem"? In this fresh and innovative book, Georg Northoff demonstrates that there is in fact a "brain problem". He argues that our brain can only be understood when its empirical functions are directly related to the modes of acquiring knowledge, our epistemic abilities and inabilities. Drawing on the latest neuroscientific data and philosophical theories, he provides an empirical-epistemic definition of the brain. Northoff reveals the basic conceptual confusion about the relationship between mind and brain that has so obstinately been lingering in both neuroscience and philosophy. He subsequently develops an alternative framework where the integration of the brain within body and environment is central. This novel approach plunges the reader into the depths of our own brain. The "Philosophy of the Brain" that emerges opens the door to a fascinating world of new findings that explore the mind and its relationship to our very human brain. (Series A)

The brain problem

Philosophy of the Brain

Applying insights from neuroscience to philosophical questions about the self, consciousness, and the healthy mind. Can we “see” or “find” consciousness in the brain? How can we create working definitions of consciousness and subjectivity, informed by what contemporary research and technology have taught us about how the brain works? How do neuronal processes in the brain relate to our experience of a personal identity? Where does the brain end and the mind begin? To explore these and other questions, esteemed philosopher and neuroscientist Georg Northoff turns to examples of unhealthy minds. By investigating consciousness through its absence—in people in vegetative states, for example—we can develop a model for understanding its presence in an active, healthy person. By examining instances of distorted self-recognition in people with psychiatric disorders, like schizophrenia, we can begin to understand how the experience of “self” is established in a stable brain. Taking an integrative approach to understanding the self, consciousness, and what it means to be mentally healthy, this book brings insights from neuroscience to bear on philosophical questions. Readers will find a science-grounded examination of the human condition with far-reaching implications for psychology, medicine, our daily lives, and beyond.

Neuro-Philosophy and the Healthy Mind: Learning from the Unwell Brain

Neuropsychoanalysis in Practice links the psyche's different psychodynamic processes to specific neuronal mechanisms in the brain. The book focuses specifically on how the brain is organized and how this organization enables the brain to differentiate between neuronal and psychodynamic states, that is, the brain and the psyche.

Brain, Self and Objects

Neuropsychoanalysis in Practice

Heinz Boeker

This book presents a comprehensive neuropsychodynamic strategy for treating psychiatric disorders. Rather than pursuing an exclusively biological, psychological, or psychodynamic approach, it offers a methodology that links all three aspects in a unifying, integrative model. Central to this approach is the view of the brain as a bio-psychosocial organ in a neuro-ecological model, rather than the purely neuronal model often presupposed in current neuroscience and psychiatry. Moreover, the book views psychopathological symptoms as spatiotemporal disorders of the altered spatiotemporal structure spanning the brain and its surrounding world. The relation between one of the core symptoms and altered neuronal activity calls for the development of integrated, circular neuropsychodynamic models of psychopathological symptoms in severe psychiatric disorders and their treatment.

Yosef Dan

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