Daniel C. Dennett

Gregg D. Caruso

The concept of free will is profoundly important to our self-understanding, our interpersonal relationships, and our moral and legal practices. If it turns out that no one is ever free and morally responsible, what would that mean for society, morality, meaning, and the law? Just Deserts brings together two philosophers – Daniel C. Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso – to debate their respective views on free will, moral responsibility, and legal punishment. In three extended conversations, Dennett and Caruso present their arguments for and against the existence of free will and debate their implications. Dennett argues that the kind of free will required for moral responsibility is compatible with determinism – for him, self-control is key; we are not responsible for becoming responsible, but are responsible for staying responsible, for keeping would-be puppeteers at bay. Caruso takes the opposite view, arguing that who we are and what we do is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control, and because of this we are never morally responsible for our actions in the sense that would make us truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. Just Deserts introduces the concepts central to the debate about free will and moral responsibility by way of an entertaining, rigorous, and sometimes heated philosophical dialogue between two leading thinkers.

Debating Free Will

Just Deserts

Some thinkers argue that our best scientific theories about the world prove that free will is an illusion. Others disagree. The concept of free will is profoundly important to our self-understanding, our interpersonal relationships, and our moral and legal practices. If it turns out that no one is ever free and morally responsible, what would that mean for society, morality, meaning, and the law? Just Deserts brings together two philosophers – Daniel C. Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso – to debate their respective views on free will, moral responsibility, and legal punishment. In three extended conversations, Dennett and Caruso present their arguments for and against the existence of free will and debate their implications. Dennett argues that the kind of free will required for moral responsibility is compatible with determinism – for him, self-control is key; we are not responsible for becoming responsible, but are responsible for staying responsible, for keeping would-be puppeteers at bay. Caruso takes the opposite view, arguing that who we are and what we do is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control, and because of this we are never morally responsible for our actions in the sense that would make us truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. These two leading thinkers introduce the concepts central to the debate about free will and moral responsibility by way of an entertaining, rigorous and sometimes heated philosophical dialogue. What emerges is a clear account of the latest thinking on free will, and what is at stake for our moral and legal practices.

Are science and religion compatible when it comes to understanding cosmology (the origin of the universe), biology (the origin of life and of the human species), ethics, and the human mind (minds, brains, souls, and free will)? Do science and religion occupy non-overlapping magisteria? Is Intelligent Design a scientific theory? How do the various faith traditions view the relationship between science and religion? What, if any, are the limits of scientific explanation? What are the most important open questions, problems, or challenges confronting the relationship between science and religion, and what are the prospects for progress? These and other questions are explored in Science and Religion: 5 Questions-a collection of thirty-three interviews based on 5 questions presented to some of the world's most influential and prominent philosophers, scientists, theologians, apologists, and atheists. Contributions by Simon Blackburn, Susan Blackmore, Sean Carroll, William Lane Craig, William Dembski, Daniel C. Dennett, George F.R. Ellis, Owen Flanagan, Owen Gingerich, Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, John F. Haught, Muzaffar Iqbal, Lawrence Krauss, Colin McGinn, Alister McGrath, Mary Midgley, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Timothy O'Connor, Massimo Pigliucci, John Polkinghorne, James Randi, Alex Rosenberg, Michael Ruse, Robert John Russell 25. John Searle, Michael Shermer, Victor J. Stenger, Robert Thurman, Michael Tooley, Charles Townes, Peter van Inwagen, Keith Ward, Rabbi David Wolpe

5 Questions

Science and Religion

گِرگ دی. کاروسو

تجسسی در وهم اراده ی آزاد و مسئولیت اخلاقی | نویسنده: گِرگ دی. کاروسو| برگردان: تقی کیمیایی اسدی | ناشر: آوای بوف نام کتاب : #تجسسی_در_وهم_اراده_ی_آزاد و #مسئولیت_اخلاقی تألیف: #گِرگ_دی_کاروسو برگردان: #تقی_کیمیایی_اسدی ناشر : #آوای_بوف سال انتشار : 1400 تعدادصفحات : 475 صفحه امور فنی و انتشار: قاسم قره داغی شابک :ISBN: 978-87-94295-04-8 #کتاب_بوف دسته بندی: #علمی #تحقیقی #پزشکی هدف این کتاب خوانندگانی هستند که اشتیاق دارند با بحث های فلسفی و علمی آرای شک گرایان در وجود اراده ی آزاد و التزامات آن آشنا شوند1. در سالهای اخیر شک در وجود اراده ی آزاد و مسئولیت های اخلاقی در ارتباط با رفتارهائی که از انسانها سر می زنند، در حال گسترش هستند. در واقع، در زمان حال تعداد قابل ملاحظه ای از فیلسوفان، روانشناسان، و دانشمندان علوم اعصاب یا در وجود اراده ی آزاد و مسئولیت اخلاقی شک دارند، و یا وجود آن را بکلی انکار می کنند. بنظر می رسد که روزبروز بر فهرست شکاکان معروف افزوده می شود2. با در نظر گرفتن ارزش عمیقی که مفهوم اراده ی آزاد و مسئولیت اخلاقی در زندگی انسانها بازی می کند – در شناخت خودمان، اجتماع، و قانون – بررسی آن چه که در قفای این موج فزاینده از منکران وجود دارد، از اهمیت زیادی برخوردار است. علاوه بر این باید عواقب بالقوه ی شک گرائی را برای خودمان و اجتماع مورد بحث قرار دهیم. اهداف این کتاب همین ها هستند. این کتاب با کمک کسانی نوشته شده است که از نظر بین المللی شناخته شده اند، و اکثر آنها به نوعی موضع شکاکی در باره ی اراده ی آزاد دارند، تا بتوان بحث های هدایت کننده در مورد شک در وجود اراده ی آزاد را گشوده، و التزامات آنها را تفحص کنیم.

Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility

تجسسی در وهم اراده ی آزاد و مسئولیت اخلاقی

Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility is an edited collection of new essays by an internationally recognized line-up of contributors. It is aimed at readers who wish to explore the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications.

Elizabeth Shaw

Derk Pereboom

'Free will skepticism' refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in action - i.e. the free will - required for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. Critics fear that adopting this view would have harmful consequences for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and laws. Optimistic free will skeptics, on the other hand, respond by arguing that life without free will and so-called basic desert moral responsibility would not be harmful in these ways, and might even be beneficial. This collection addresses the practical implications of free will skepticism for law and society. It contains eleven original essays that provide alternatives to retributive punishment, explore what (if any) changes are needed for the criminal justice system, and ask whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic about the real-world implications of free will skepticism.

Challenging Retributive Justice

Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society

This book argues two main things: The first is that there is no such thing as free will—at least not in the sense most ordinary folk take to be central or fundamental; the second is that the strong and pervasive belief in free will can be accounted for through a careful analysis of our phenomenology and a proper theoretical understanding of consciousness.

Gregg D. Caruso

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