Hannu Nurmi

Voting paradoxes are unpleasant surprises encountered in voting. Typically they suggest that something is wrong with the way in dividual opinions are being expressed or processed in voting. The outcomes are bizarre, unfair or otherwise implausible, given the expressed opinions of voters. Voting paradoxes have an important role in the history of social choice theory. The founding fathers of the theory, Marquis de Condorcet and Jean-Charles de Borda, were keenly aware of some of them. Indeed, much of the work of these and other forerunners of the modern social choice theory dealt with ways of avoiding paradoxes related to voting. One of the early paradoxes, viz. that bearing the name of Condorcet, has subsequently gained such a prominent place in the literature that it is sometimes called the paradox of voting. One of the aims of the present work is to show that Condorcet's is but one of many paradoxes of voting. Some of these are pretty closely interrelated making it meaningful to classify them. This is the second main aim of this book. The third objective is to suggest ways of dealing with paradoxes. Since voting is and has always been an essential instrument of democratic rule, it is of some in terest to find out how voting paradoxes are being dealt with by past and present methods of voting. Of even greater interest is to find ways of minimizing the probability of occurrence of various paradoxes. By their very nature some paradoxes are unavoidable.

Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them

Janusz Kacprzyk

Slawomir Zadrozny

Mario Fedrizzi

Enrique Herrera-Viedma

José Luis García-Lapresta

The word consensus has been frequently used for centuries, perhaps millenia. People have always deemed it important that decisions having a long lasting impact on groups, countries or even civilizations be arrived at in a consensual manner. Undoubtedly the complexity of modern world in all its social, technological, economic and cultural dimensions has created new environments where consensus is regarded desirable. Consensus typically denotes a state of agreement prevailing in a group of agents, human or software. In the strict sense of the term, consensus means that the agreement be unanimous. Since such a state is often unreachable or even unnecessary, other less demanding consensus-related notions have been introduced. These typically involve some graded, partial or imprecise concepts. The contributions to this volume define and utilize such less demanding - and thus at the same time more general - notions of consensus. However, consensus can also refer to a process whereby the state of agreement is reached. Again this state can be something less stringent than a complete unanimity of all agents regarding all options. The process may involve modifications, resolutions and /or mitigations of the views or inputs of individuals or software agents in order to achieve the state of consensus understood in the more general sense. The consensus reaching processes call for some soft computational approaches, methods and techniques, notably fuzzy and possibilistic ones. These are needed to accommodate the imprecision in the very meaning of some basic concepts utilized in the definition of consensus as a state of agreement and as a process whereby this state is to be reached. The overall aim of this volume is to provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of the issues related to consensus states and consensual processes.

Consensual Processes

Dan S. Felsenthal

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.

Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes

Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate

George Tsebelis

Peter Brouwer

Klass Staal

Peter Emerson

Christian Klamler

Peter Swann

Sascha Kurz

This volume sets out with a discussion of the Dutch project of improving democracy and ends with a discussion of the Robot revolution. It contains contributions such as Peter Brouwer and Klaas Staal, The Future Viability of the Dutch Democracy; Hannu Nurmi, Remarks on “The Future Viability of the Dutch Democracy;” George Tsebelis and Jesse M. Crosson, Can the Dutch Electoral System be Improved Upon? Ryan Kendall, Decomposing Democracy: A Comment on “The Future Viability of the Dutch Democracy;” Peter Emerson, Can Rights Be Wrong? Towards a Less Majoritarian More Inclusive Democracy; Jan Oreský and Prokop Čech, Alternative Voting, Alternative Outcomes: 2018 Presidential Election in the Czech Republic; G. M. Peter Swann, Stalemate by Design? How Binary Voting Caused the Brexit Impasse of 2019; Florian Follert, Improving the Relationship between Citizens and Politicians; Sascha Kurz, Which Criteria Qualify Power Indices for Applications? - A Comment on “The Story of the Poor Public Good Index;” Matthias Weber, Thoughts on Voting Power and the Public Good Index; Claude Hillinger, The Case of Utilitarian Voting Christian Klamler, Utilitarian Voting - Some Empirical Evidence; Chris Hudson, Robots: Present and Future; and Bruce Morley, Robots Are Coming. Review of “John Hudson, The Robot Revolution: Understanding the Social and Economic Impact”

Munich Social Science Review, New Series, Volume 3

Tapio Raunio

Festschrift for Matti Wiberg

The Serious Game of Politics

Hannu Nurmi

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