J C Sharman

Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni

How and why NGOs are increasingly taking independent and direct action in global law enforcement, from human rights to the environment Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have generally served as advocates and service providers, leaving enforcement to states. Now, NGOs are increasingly acting as private police, prosecutors, and intelligence agencies in enforcing international law. NGOs today can be found investigating and gathering evidence; suing and prosecuting governments, companies, and individuals; and even catching lawbreakers red-handed. Examining this trend, Vigilantes beyond Borders considers why some transnational groups have opted to become enforcers of international law regarding such issues as human rights, the environment, and corruption, while others have not. Three factors explain the rise of vigilante enforcement: demand, supply, and competition. Governments commit to more international laws, but do a poor job of policing them, leaving a gap and creating demand. Legal and technological changes make it easier for nonstate actors to supply enforcement, as in the instances of NGOs that have standing to use domestic and international courts, or smaller NGOs that employ satellite imagery, big data analysis, and forensic computing. As the growing number of NGOs vie for limited funding and media attention, smaller, more marginal, groups often adopt radical strategies like enforcement. Looking at the workings of major organizations, including Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and Transparency International, as well as smaller players, such as Global Witness, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, and Bellingcat, Vigilantes beyond Borders explores the causes and consequences of a novel, provocative approach to global governance.

NGOs as Enforcers of International Law

Vigilantes Beyond Borders

Andrew Phillips

"From Spanish conquistadors through to pith-helmeted British colonialists, the prevailing vision of European empire-builders has been staunchly statist. But from the early 1600s through to the early twentieth century, from the East Indies to North America to Africa and the South Pacific, it was company states - not sovereign states - that played the most important role in driving European worldwide commercial and colonial expansion. In Asia, the Dutch and English East India Companies ingratiated themselves with mighty Asian rulers such as the Mughal and Qing Emperors to infiltrate Asian markets. In North America, the Hudson's Bay Company maintained a network of forts and factories across the continent closely integrated with American Indian trading routes and practices. And in Africa, the company states were first key intermediaries in the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and later the colonial vanguards of the 'scramble for Africa.' Notwithstanding their central importance for both International Relations scholars and students of global history, company states remain largely ignored in studies of the modern international system's evolution and expansion. Beholden to an outdated historiography, most scholarship on the expansion of the international system looks only at sovereign states. Historians and historical sociologists have done more to acknowledge company states' pioneering role. But these studies have typically focused on individual company states in isolation, and have thus missed the significance of company states as key progenitors of the modern international system. As a result of this neglect, we lack an understanding of what defined the company states as a distinctive form of international actor, and how they served as crucial but now largely forgotten builders of the world's first truly global international system. Existing works struggle to account for rise, fall and fleeting nineteenth century resurrection of company states as agents of long distance commerce and conquest, as well as their sharply contrasting fortunes in different regions. Finally, unless we understand the nature and significance of company states, we cannot understand how inter-civilizational relations were mediated across trans-continental distances and deep cultural differences for the majority of the modern era. These are the vital gaps in our knowledge which the authors seek to address in this book"--Provided by publisher.

How Company-States Made the Modern World

Outsourcing Empire

Vigilantes beyond Borders

What accounts for the rise of the state, the creation of the first global system, and the dominance of the West? The conventional answer asserts that superior technology, tactics, and institutions forged by Darwinian military competition gave Europeans a decisive advantage in war over other civilizations from 1500 onward. In contrast, Empires of the Weak argues that Europeans actually had no general military superiority in the early modern era. J. C. Sharman shows instead that European expansion from the late fifteenth to the late eighteenth centuries is better explained by deference to strong Asian and African polities, disease in the Americas, and maritime supremacy earned by default because local land-oriented polities were largely indifferent to war and trade at sea. Europeans were overawed by the mighty Eastern empires of the day, which pioneered key military innovations and were the greatest early modern conquerors. Against the view that the Europeans won for all time, Sharman contends that the imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a relatively transient and anomalous development in world politics that concluded with Western losses in various insurgencies. If the twenty-first century is to be dominated by non-Western powers like China, this represents a return to the norm for the modern era. Bringing a revisionist perspective to the idea that Europe ruled the world due to military dominance, Empires of the Weak demonstrates that the rise of the West was an exception in the prevailing world order.

J C Sharman

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