Jonathan Rodden

As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book lays out the first systematic explanation of why decentralized countries have had dramatically different fiscal experiences. It provides insights into current policy debates from Latin America to the European Union, and a new perspective on a tension between the promise and peril of federalism that has characterized the literature since The Federalist Papers.

The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism

Hamilton's Paradox

Professor Jonathan A Rodden

Gunnar S. Eskeland

Jennie Ilene Litvack

A multi-country study of the conditions under which decentralized countries might ensure fiscal discipline. In many parts of the world, lower levels of government are taking over responsibilities from national authorities. This often leads to difficulty in maintaining fiscal discipline. So-called soft budget constraints allow these subnational governments to expand expenditures without facing the full cost. Until now, however, there has been little understanding of how decentralization leads to large fiscal deficits and macroeconomic instability. This book, based on a research project at the World Bank, develops an analytical framework for considering the issues related to soft budget constraints, including the institutions, history, and policies that drive expectations for bailouts among subnational governments. It examines fiscal, financial, political, and land market mechanisms for subnational discipline in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Hungary, India, Norway, South Africa, Ukraine, and the United States. The book concludes that the dichotomy between market and hierarchical mechanisms is false. Most countries--and virtually all developing countries--must rely on market mechanisms as well as hierarchical constraints to maintain fiscal discipline. When bailouts cannot be avoided, they present important opportunities to reform underlying institutions. Successful market discipline--where voluntary lenders perform important monitoring functions--is most likely to emerge from a gradual process that begins with carefully crafted rules and oversight.

Jonathan Rodden

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