Keir Giles

Strategic Studies Institute

Rhetoric and Reality

Russian Ballistic Missile Defense

No New Model Army

Military Service in Russia

Andrew Wood

Roderic Lyne

James Nixey

James Sherr

The war in Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin's bid to overturn the post-Cold War international settlement in Europe, have forced many Western governments to reappraise their approach to Russia. Until 2003, it was widely believed that a modernizing Russia might be accommodated into the international system as a constructive and benign actor. Variations on this view have given way to the realization that Russia, on its present course, cannot be a partner or ally, and that differences outweigh any common interests. Russia needs reform, but the domestic political obstacles to it are daunting. At the same time, if Moscow maintains its current course, in both economic management and international relations, this will be increasingly dangerous for Europe and costly, if not disastrous, for Russia. The questions addressed in this report are how far those costs will rise, whether Russia can bear them, what will happen if it cannot, and how the West should respond in the near and longer term.

The Russian Challenge

From Moscow, the world looks different. It is through understanding how Russia sees the world—and its place in it—that the West can best meet the Russian challenge. Russia and the West are like neighbors who never seem able to understand each other. A major reason, this book argues, is that Western leaders tend to think that Russia should act as a “rational” Western nation—even though Russian leaders for centuries have thought and acted based on their country's much different history and traditions. Russia, through Western eyes, is unpredictable and irrational, when in fact its leaders from the czars to Putin almost always act in their own very predictable and rational ways. For Western leaders to try to engage with Russia without attempting to understand how Russians look at the world is a recipe for repeated disappointment and frequent crises. Keir Giles, a senior expert on Russia at Britain's prestigious Chatham House, describes how Russian leaders have used consistent doctrinal and strategic approaches to the rest of the world. These approaches may seem deeply alien in the West, but understanding them is essential for successful engagement with Moscow. Giles argues that understanding how Moscow's leaders think—not just Vladimir Putin but his predecessors and eventual successors—will help their counterparts in the West develop a less crisis-prone and more productive relationship with Russia.

What Drives Russia to Confront the West

Moscow Rules

From Moscow, the world looks different. It is through understanding how Russia sees the world--and its place in it--that the West can best meet the Russian challenge. Russia and the West are like neighbors who never seem able to understand each other. A major reason, this book argues, is that Western leaders tend to think that Russia should act as a "rational" Western nation--even though Russian leaders for centuries have thought and acted based on their country's much different history and traditions. Russia, through Western eyes, is unpredictable and irrational, when in fact its leaders from the czars to Putin almost always act in their own very predictable and rational ways. For Western leaders to try to engage with Russia without attempting to understand how Russians look at the world is a recipe for repeated disappointment and frequent crises. Keir Giles, a senior expert on Russia at Britain's prestigious Chatham House, describes how Russian leaders have used consistent doctrinal and strategic approaches to the rest of the world. These approaches may seem deeply alien in the West, but understanding them is essential for successful engagement with Moscow. Giles argues that understanding how Moscow's leaders think--not just Vladimir Putin but his predecessors and eventual successors--will help their counterparts in the West develop a less crisis-prone and more productive relationship with Russia.

Susanna Eskola

"Because of both history and geography, the Finnish relationship with Russia is unique in Europe. At the same time the Finnish perception of Russia as a source of security challenges is acute. Finland is engaged in a debate over whether it would be desirable to seek membership of NATO in order to mitigate these challenges. A full and frank debate has been difficult because it is constrained by a range of political and societal taboos; nevertheless there are indicators that a move toward NATO is not impossible in the foreseeable future. If Finland were to opt for joining NATO, this would register in Russian defence and security thinking as a serious concern. Unlike the Baltic accession in 2004, the response from the newly assertive Russia could potentially be swift and damaging. This would also have implications for Russian relations with the EU, of which Finland has been a member since 1995. Many in Finland see the EU as a security provider, and there is confusion in the national debate between EU or Nordic security policy cooperation and an actual defensive alliance. Finland's NATO argument is a complex and multi-faceted one, made even more so by regional and cultural specifics; but it needs to be understood because its result could have a major impact on Russia's relationships with both NATO and the EU."--P.i.

Finland, NATO and Russia

Waking the Neighbour

Keir Giles

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