Amartya Sen

Kenneth J. Arrow

Kōtarō Suzumura

The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare presents, in two volumes, essays on past and on-going work in social choice theory and welfare economics. The first volume consists of four parts. In Part 1 (Arrovian Impossibility Theorems), various aspects of Arrovian general impossibility theorems, illustrated by the simple majority cycle first identified by Condorcet, are expounded and evaluated. It also provides a critical survey of the work on different escape routes from impossibility results of this kind. In Part 2 (Voting Schemes and Mechanisms), the operation and performance of voting schemes and cost-sharing mechanisms are examined axiomatically, and some aspects of the modern theory of incentives and mechanism design are expounded and surveyed. In Part 3 (structure of social choice rules), the positional rules of collective decision-making (the origin of which can be traced back to a seminal proposal by Borda), the game-theoretic aspects of voting in committees, and the implications of making use of interpersonal comparisons of welfare (with or without cardinal measurability) are expounded, and the status of utilitarianism as a theory of justice is critically examined. It also provides an analytical survey of the foundations of measurement of inequality and poverty. In order to place these broad issues (as well as further issues to be discussed in the second volume of the Handbook) in perspective, Kotaro Suzumura has written an extensive introduction, discussing the historical background of social choice theory, the vistas opened by Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, the famous "socialist planning" controversy, and the theoretical and practical significance of social choice theory. The primary purpose of this Handbook is to provide an accessible introduction to the current state of the art in social choice theory and welfare economics. The expounded theory has a strong and constructive message for pursuing human well-being and facilitating collective decision-making. *Advances economists' understanding of recent advances in social choice and welfare *Distills and applies research to a wide range of social issues *Provides analytical material for evaluating new scholarship *Offers consolidated reviews and analyses of scholarship in a framework that encourages synthesis--

Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

A.K. Sen

Kotaro Suzumura

One of two volumes, 'The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare' contains a series of essays that examine past and on-going social choice theory and welfare economics. It provides a means to making collective decisions on such issues.

Yew-Kwang Ng

Xiaokai Yang

Selected papers from many leading Australian, American, Asian, British and European economists of an international conference at Monash University sparked by the first Australian visit by Kenneth J. Arrow, Nobel Laureate in Economics. Part 1 extends the recently emerged New Classical Economics which uses inframarginal analysis to formally examine classical economic problems of specialization with insights on trade, growth, and many other issues. Part 2 analyses the implications of increasing returns and the associated non-perfect competition on some macro problems like the effects of nominal aggregate demand on output and the price level. Part 3 analyses the relationships of information, returns to scale, and issues of resources and trade.

Increasing Returns and Economic Analysis

Originally published in 1951, "Social Choice and Individual Values" introduced "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem" and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science. This new edition, including a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, reintroduces Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers. "Far beyond a classic, this small book unleashed the ongoing explosion of interest in social choice and voting theory. A half-century later, the book remains full of profound insight: its central message, 'Arrow's Theorem, ' has changed the way we think."--Donald G. Saari, author of "Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected "

Third Edition

Social Choice and Individual Values

Partha Dasgupta

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Amartya K. Sen

Robert C. Lind

Gordon R. Corey

Thomas Stauffer

J.A. Stockfisch

This is a collection of theoretical papers, including contributions by Partha Dasgupta and three Nobel prize-winning economists: Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Joseph Stiglitz. Originally published in 1982.

Kenneth J. Arrow

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