Manfred J. Holler

Is Convention Economics a New Kind of Economics, Or Something Else? LEARRY GAGNÉ Homo Economicus in Neoclassical Economics: Some Conceptual Curiosities about Behavioural Criticisms KHANDAKAR QUDRAT-I ELAHI Classiÿ cation of Land Use: Further development of the ISO standard for Land Administration, ISO 19152 JESPER MAYNTZ PAASCH AND JENNY PAULSSON The Geography of Culture and Human Development in ItalyI LARIA PETRARCA AND ROBERTO RICCIUTIE lecting the PopeLÁSZLÓ Á. KÓCZY AND BALÁZS SZIKLAI Ready for the Design of Voting Rules? SASCHA KURZ Is there a future to power index research? (Symposium) MANFRED J. HOLLER (ED.) Mostly Sunny: A Forecast of Tomorrow‘s Power Index Research SASCHA KURZ, NICOLA MAASER, STEFAN NAPEL AND MATTHIAS WEBER Some Open Problems in the Applications of Power Indices to Politics and Finance CESARINO BERTINI, GIANFRANCO GAMBARELLI AND IZABELLA STACH Public Choice Re° ections on the Measurement of Political Power JEAN-MICHEL JOSSELIN Index of Power: Post Mortem Phase? JACEK MERCIK

Homo Oeconomicus 32 (1)

Homo Oeconomicus 29 (4)

Homo Oeconomicus 29 (2)

Homo Oeconomicus, Volume 31, Number 3 (2014)Multicriteria for MultidecidersLORENZO CIONIUsing Civil Servants for Rent Seeking: An Application of the Pay-and- Use ValueMARTIN KOHL AND HARALD WIESEA New CS Value for Team Games TOBIAS HILLERThe Contact Hypothesis and Its Application to Elections: Does it Pay for Political Parties to Contact Voters Directly or Not?ACHILLEFS PAPAGEORGIOUClashing Sensibilities in Politics and Literature: The Cases of Rex Warner and Czesław MiłoszLEONIDAS DONSKISWhy do Some, and Only Some, Artists Want a Droit de Suite? BJÖRN FRANKAttendance at/Participation in the Arts by Educational Level: Evidence and IssuesJOHN W. O’HAGANReview: Beyond and Behind Homo Economicus in Alternative Views of Public EconomicsFRANCESCO FORTEBack Issues Instructions for Contributors

Homo Oeconomicus 31(3)

Barbara Klose-Ullmann

This book introduces readers to basic game theory as a tool to deal with strategic decision problems, helping them to understand the complexity of such problems – to extract a solution, if possible – and to manage the complexity by revising the game if appropriate. The authors discuss basic decision situations modeled as Prisoners’ Dilemma, Chicken Game, and Stag Hunt Game, as well as concepts like the Nash equilibrium, Trembling Hand Perfectness, Rationalizable Strategies and the Theory of Moves to introduce game theoretic thinking. Further, the book presents pioneers of strategic thinking, e.g., Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Adam Smith, and Goethe, and includes cases of conflict and cooperation to illustrate practical applications. Readers learn to apply game theory in business and in daily life – to manage their decision problems and to better understand the decision problems of others.

Game Theory for Those Who Manage

Scissors and Rock

Letter to the Queen

The highly praised Western, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, has been used in many game-theory courses over the years and has also found its way into leading journals of this field. Using the rich material offered by this movie, alongside other elements from popular culture, literature and history, this book furthers this exploration into a fascinating area of economics. In his series of Schumpeter lectures, Manfred J. Holler uses his analysis of Sergio Leone’s movie as a starting point to argue that combinations of desires, secrets and second-mover advantages trigger conflicts but also allow for conflict resolution. Many people and organizations have a desire for secrecy, and this is often motivated by a desire to create a second-mover advantage, and by undercutting the second-mover advantage of others. This book demonstrates that the interaction of these three ingredients account for a large share of social problems and failures in politics and business but, somewhat paradoxically, can also help to overcome some of the problems that result by applying one or two of them in isolation. This book has been written for curious readers who want to see the world from a different perspective and who like simple mathematics alongside story telling. Its accessible approach means that it will be of use to students and academics alike, especially all those interested in decision making, game theory, and market entry.

Secrets, Desires, and Second-Mover Advantages

The Economics of the Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Gerhard Illing

Einführung in die Spieltheorie

Stefan Napel

Was hat Hamlet falsch gemacht? In diesem Buch lernen Sie Instrumente kennen, mit denen Sie dieser Frage systematisch nachgehen können – die Ihnen helfen, Entscheidungssituationen zu durchdenken, die sich durch Konflikte und Koordinationsprobleme auszeichnen. Mit Hilfe spieltheoretischer Konzepte und Ansätze werden Sie Ihre Antwort darauf finden, was Hamlet falsch gemacht hat, warum der Kalte Krieg „kalt" blieb und warum Michelin seinen Eintritt in den US-Markt besser vermieden hätte. Die Spieltheorie ist aus der heutigen Ökonomik nicht mehr wegzudenken. Auch in der Politikwissenschaft, Soziologie und Philosophie findet sich inzwischen ein breites Band sehr unterschiedlicher Anwendungen. Diese Einführung in die Spieltheorie liefert die theoretischen Grundlagen und schult beim Leser die spieltheoretische Argumentationsweise. Für die vorliegende 8. Auflage wurden große Teile der Kapitel 1 bis 4 gründlich überarbeitet und ergänzt. Das neue Kapitel 9 bietet unterhaltsame Einblicke in die spannende (Vor-)Geschichte der Spieltheorie. Eine gut lesbare Einführung!

Manfred J. Holler

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