Shari Lawrence Pfleeger

Martin C. Libicki

Rand Corporation

Across a wide variety of endeavors, failure to anticipate disaster has been ascribed to the inability to "connect the dots." But to "connect the dots," one must first "collect the dots." The authors investigate the barriers to circulating important information and describes approaches for bringing information together in a meaningful way and describe a formal process for collecting the dots.

Problem Formulation and Solution Elements

Collecting the Dots

Forrest E. Morgan

Paul DeLuca

David R. Frelinger

Eric Heginbotham

Michael Nixon

Jacob L. Heim

Jeff Hagen

Sheng Li

Jeffrey Engstrom

David A. Shlapak

Burgess Laird

Kyle Brady

Lyle J. Morris

A RAND study analyzed Chinese and U.S. military capabilities in two scenarios (Taiwan and the Spratly Islands) from 1996 to 2017, finding that trends in most, but not all, areas run strongly against the United States. While U.S. aggregate power remains greater than China’s, distance and geography affect outcomes. China is capable of challenging U.S. military dominance on its immediate periphery—and its reach is likely to grow in the years ahead.

Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017

The U.S.-China Military Scorecard

This report looks at the growing but confusing body of information technology standards by concentrating on 7 areas: UNIX OS; OSI for data communication; DoD's CALS; the Ada programming langua ISDN, narrow band and broadb multimedia standards (text, database, and image compression), and 5 specialized standards (encryption, electronic chip design, machine tools, maps, TRON). Each realm is examined from several viewpoints: the problems that need to be solved, the degree of success of standards, the role of public policy in the standards process, and major trends in each area. Charts and tables.

Standards: the Rough Road to the Common Byte

Lillian Ablon

Andrea A. Golay

Criminal activities in cyberspace are increasingly facilitated by burgeoning black markets. This report characterizes these markets and how they have grown into their current state to provide insight into how their existence can harm the information security environment. Understanding these markets lays the groundwork for exploring options to minimize their potentially harmful influence.

Hackers' Bazaar

Markets for Cybercrime Tools and Stolen Data

Astrid Stuth Cevallos

Scott Warren Harold

This study explores U.S. policy options for managing cyberspace relations with China via agreements and norms of behavior. If negotiations can lead to meaningful norms, this report looks at what each side might offer to achieve an acceptable outcome.

Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace

This updated and expanded edition of Cyberspace in Peace and War by Martin C. Libicki presents a comprehensive understanding of cybersecurity, cyberwar, and cyber-terrorism. From basic concepts to advanced principles, Libicki examines the sources and consequences of system compromises, addresses strategic aspects of cyberwar, and defines cybersecurity in the context of military operations while highlighting unique aspects of the digital battleground and strategic uses of cyberwar. This new edition provides updated analysis on cyberespionage, including the enigmatic behavior of Russian actors, making this volume a timely and necessary addition to the cyber-practitioner's library. Cyberspace in Peace and War guides readers through the complexities of cybersecurity and cyberwar and challenges them to understand the topics in new ways. Libicki provides the technical and geopolitical foundations of cyberwar necessary to understand the policies, operations, and strategies required for safeguarding an increasingly online infrastructure.

Cyberspace in Peace and War, Second Edition

Project Air Force (U.S.)

Cyberspace, where information—and hence serious value—is stored and manipulated, is a tempting target. An attacker could be a person, group, or state and may disrupt or corrupt the systems from which cyberspace is built. When states are involved, it is tempting to compare fights to warfare, but there are important differences. The author addresses these differences and ways the United States protect itself in the face of attack.

Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Gregory F. Treverton

Stuart E. Johnson

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold WarÃ‘and then the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001Ã‘transformed the task of American foreign and defense policymaking. This book outlines the dimensions of that transformation and sketches new tools for dealing with the policy challengesÃ‘from modeling and gaming, to planning based on capabilities rather than threats, to personnel planning and making use of "best practices" from the private sector.

New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking

Seth G. Jones

Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase "war on terrorism" since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa'ida."--BOOK JACKET.

Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida

How Terrorist Groups End

Tim Webb

This report, the second in a series, reveals insights from chief information security officers; examines network defense measures and attacker-created countermeasures; and explores software vulnerabilities and inherent weaknesses.

Charting a Course Toward Cybersecurity

The Defender’s Dilemma

It is still easy to underestimate how much the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War?--and then the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001?--transformed the task of American foreign and defense policymaking. In place of predictability (if a sometimes terrifying predictability), the world is now very unpredictable. In place of a single overriding threat and benchmark by which all else could be measured, a number of possible threats have arisen, not all of them states. In place of force-on-force engagements, U.S. defense planners have to assume "asymmetric" threats?--ways not to defeat U.S. power but to render it irrelevant. This book frames the challenges for defense policy that the transformed world engenders, and it sketches new tools for dealing with those challenges?--from new techniques in modeling and gaming, to planning based on capabilities rather than threats, to personnel planning and making use of "best practices" from the private sector.

The Winning Edge

Dominant Battlespace Knowledge

Partial contents include: DBK: Opportunity and Challenges; DBK and its Consequences; Significance of Dominant Battlefield Awareness; The Future of Command and Control with DBK; Dominant Battlefield Awareness and Future Warfare; DBK with Autonomous Weapons; Just In Time Warfare.

Ben Connable

RAND studied 89 modern insurgency cases to test conventional understanding about how insurgencies end. Findings relevant to policymakers and analysts include that modern insurgencies last about ten years; withdrawal of state support cripples insurgencies; civil defense forces are useful for both sides; pseudodemocracies fare poorly against insurgents; and governments win more often in the long run.

How Insurgencies End

Cyberspace, where information--and hence serious value--is stored and manipulated, is a tempting target. An attacker could be a person, group, or state and may disrupt or corrupt the systems from which cyberspace is built. When states are involved, it is tempting to compare fights to warfare, but there are important differences. The author addresses these differences and ways the United States protect itself in the face of attack.

Martin C. Libicki

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