Ruth Adler

Neil MacCormick

Robert Alexy

What is to be understood by 'rational legal argument'? To what extent can legal reasoning be rational? Is the demand for rationality in legal affairs justified? And what are the criteria of rationality in legal reasoning? The answer to these questions is not only of interest to legal theorists and philosophers of law. They are pressing issues for practicing lawyers, and a matter of concern for every citizen active in the public arena. Not only the standing of academic law as a scientific discipline, but also the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on the possibility of rational legal argumentation. A theory of legal reasoning which tries to answer these questions pre-supposes a theory of general practical reasoning. This theory is the subject matter of the first two parts of the book. The result is a theory of general practical discourse which rests on insights of both Anglo-Saxon and German philosophy. It forms the basis of the theory of rational legal discourse, which is developed in the third part of this book.

The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification

A Theory of Legal Argumentation

What makes an argument in a law case good or bad? Can legal decisions be justified by purely rational argument or are they ultimately determined by more subjective influences? These questions are central to the study of jurisprudence, and are thoroughly and critically examined in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, now with a new and up-to-date foreword. Its clarity of explanation and argument make this classic legal text readily accessible to lawyers, philosophers, and any general reader interested in legal processes, human reasoning, or practical logic.

Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory

Zenon Bankowski

"The present volume deals with a number of fundamental issues in philosophy of law and social philosophy. The reviews and perspectives it represents are thoroughly international in scope and range, with the participation of leading thinkers from six continents. Within the overall theme of 'Enlightenment, Rights and Revolution', each of the sub-themes has been so well explored by its authors that the whole does amount to more than the sum of its parts. As editors, we might have been temped to claim credit for this beyond our due; in truth, however, the authors of the essays which make up the book did it all with a minimum of editorial intervention, and in a very short time. We are profoundly grateful to them all."--Preface.

Essays in Legal and Social Philosophy

Enlightenment, Rights and Revolution

In this substantially revised second edition, Neil MacCormick delivers a clear and current introduction to the life and works of H.L.A. Hart, noted Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University from 1952 to 1968. Hart established a worldwide reputation through his powerful philosophical arguments and writings in favor of liberalizing criminal law and applying humane principles to punishment. This book demonstrates that Hart also made important contributions to analytical jurisprudence, notably by clarifying many terms and concepts used in legal discourse, including the concept of law itself. Taking into account developments since the first edition was published, this book provides a constructively critical account of Hart's legal thought. The work includes Hart's ideas on legal reasoning, judicial discretion, the social sources of law, the theory of legal rules, the sovereignty of individual conscience, the notion of obligation, the concept of a right, and the relationship between morality and the law. MacCormick actively engages with current scholarly interpretations, bringing this accessible account of England's greatest legal philosopher of the twentieth century up-to-date.

Neil MacCormick

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