Richard Steinberg

Yoav Shoham

Peter C. Cramton

A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.

Combinatorial Auctions

Yan Chen

John A. List

Axel Ockenfels

We review past research and discuss future directions on how the vibrant research areas of market design and behavioral economics have influenced and will continue to impact the science and practice of management in both the private and public sectors. Using examples from various auction markets, reputation and feedback systems in online markets, matching markets in education, and labor markets, we demonstrate that combining market design theory, behavioral insights, and experimental methods can lead to fruitful implementation of superior market designs in practice.

Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management

Joseph S. Tracy

Abstract: Using Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January 1967 to March 1993, we find that wages and strikes are substantially influenced by labor policy. In particular, we find that prohibiting the use of replacement workers during strikes is associated with significantly higher wages, and more frequent and longer strikes. This is consistent with private information theories of bargaining. We estimate the welfare consequences of a ban on replacement workers, as well as other labor policies. Despite the higher dispute costs, union workers are better off with a ban on replacement workers. The higher wage more than compensates for the more frequent and longer strikes.

Peter C. Cramton

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