Colin S. Gray

Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies Colin S Gray

Weaponry does not equal strategy, argues Colin Gray, but the two are often confused, resulting in such linguistic errors as strategic weapons. There may be an interactive relationship between policy, strategy and weaponry but, he contends, policy and strategy always take the front seat.

Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology

Weapons Don't Make War

Chapter Introduction: Strategic history -- chapter 1 Themes and contexts of strategic history -- chapter 2 Carl von Clausewitz and the theory of war -- chapter 3 From limited war to national war: The French Revolution and the Napoleonic way of war -- chapter 4 The nineteenth century, I: A strategic view -- chapter 5 The nineteenth century, II: Technology, warfare and international order -- chapter 6 World War I, I: Controversies -- chapter 7 World War I, II: Modern warfare -- chapter 8 The twenty-year armistice, 1919-39 -- chapter 9 The mechanization of war -- chapter 10 World War II in Europe, I: The structure and course of total war -- chapter 11 World War II in Europe, II: Understanding the war -- chapter 12 World War II in Asia-Pacific, I: Japan and the politics of empire -- chapter 13 World War II in Asia-Pacific, II: Strategy and warfare -- chapter 14 The Cold War, I: Politics and ideology -- chapter 15 The Cold War, II: The nuclear revolution -- chapter 16 War and peace after the Cold War: An interwar decade -- chapter 17 9/11 and the age of terror -- chapter 18 Irregular warfare: Guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists -- chapter 19 War, peace and international order -- chapter 20 Conclusion: Must future strategic history resemble the past?.

An Introduction to Strategic History

War, Peace and International Relations

"If peace breaks out, can arms control be far behind?" According to Colin S. Gray, this sardonic motto describes events of the 1990s just as well as it did those of the 1920s. Gray offers a provocative history of twentieth-century attempts at arms limitation, as he challenges the fundamental assumptions of arms control theory. Arms control has never worked, he concludes, because it never can. Existing approaches to arms control appeal to common sense, but they are logically unsound and inherently impractical, Gray argues, because they fail to take political realities into account. He outlines their inadequacies in what he calls the Arms Control Paradox: the more motivated nations are to fight one another, the less interested they will be in supporting significant arms limitations. Under these conditions, arms control agreements must be, to echo a phrase of George Will's, either impossible or unimportant. Documenting the naval treaties of the 1920s and 1930s and the initiatives to limit strategic nuclear arms from 1969 to the present, Gray seeks to demonstrate that the fortunes of negotiated arms limitation have merely reflected the temperature of international relations, rather than influencing those relations. National security analysts, students and scholars of international relations, and others interested in arms control issues will want to read House of Cards and debate its conclusions.

Why Arms Control Must Fail

House of Cards

The author takes issue with the complacent belief that a happy mixture of deterrence, arms control and luck will enable humanity to cope adequately with weapons of mass destruction, arguing that the risks are ever more serious.

Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies Colin S Gray

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