Rik Peels

Martijn Blaauw

Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. This is surprising for, contrary to what one might expect, it is not clear what ignorance is. Some philosophers say or assume that it is a lack of knowledge, whereas others claim or presuppose that it is an absence of true belief. What is one ignorant of when one is ignorant? What kinds of ignorance are there? This neglect is also remarkable because ignorance plays a crucial role in all sorts of controversial societal issues. Ignorance is often thought to be a moral and legal excuse; it is a core concept in medical ethics and debates about privacy, and it features in religious traditions and debates about belief in God. This book does not only study an epistemic phenomenon that is interesting in itself, but also provides important tools that can be fruitfully used in debates within and beyond philosophy.

The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance

Stefan Paas

Moet je gek zijn om in God te geloven? Of op z'n minst naïef, onkritisch en zweverig? Hoewel moderne mensen hebben afgerekend met de illusie dat er een God bestaat, wil God maar niet dood. Buiten Europa groeit religieus geloof gestaag en zelfs in het seculiere Nederland zijn er mensen die zich tot het geloof bekeren. Natuurlijk kunnen we dat zien als een nieuw bewijs voor de onuitroeibare irrationaliteit van mensen, maar misschien is er meer aan de hand. Misschien is geloven in God niet zo dom als het lijkt. In God bewijzen zetten twee gelovige wetenschappers de argumenten voor en tegen Godsgeloof op een rij. Ze doen dat op een milde manier, zonder polemiek of bekeringsijver, maar met vaart en humor. Het boek is tot stand gekomen met medewerking van gelovige en niet-gelovige wetenschappers uit verschillende vakgebieden en bevat de laatste wetenschappelijke en filosofische inzichten over religie.

argumenten voor en tegen geloven

God bewijzen

René van Woudenberg

A comprehensive exploration of the historical development and philosophical importance of common-sense philosophy.

The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy

What we believe and what we do not believe has a great impact on what we do and fail to do. Hence, if we want to act responsibly, we should believe responsibly. However, do we have the kind of control over our beliefs that such responsibility for our beliefs seems to require? Do we have certain obligations to control or influence our beliefs on particular occasions? And do we sometimes believe responsibly despite violating such obligations, namely because we are excused by, say, indoctrination or ignorance? By answering each of these questions, Rik Peels provides a theory of what it is to believe responsibly. He argues that we lack control over our beliefs, but that we can nonetheless influence our beliefs by performing actions that make a difference to what we believe. We have a wide variety of moral, prudential, and epistemic obligations to perform such belief-influencing actions. We can be held responsible for our beliefs in virtue of such influence on our beliefs. Sometimes, we believe responsibly despite having violated such obligations, namely if we are excused, by force, ignorance, or luck. A careful consideration of these excuses teaches us, respectively, that responsible belief entails that we could have failed to have that belief, that responsible belief is in a specific sense radically subjective, and that responsible belief is compatible with its being a matter of luck that we hold that belief.

Rik Peels

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