Ronald O'Rourke

The Navy's new Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program envisions procuring a class of 28 to 30 new amphibious ships to support the Marine Corps, particularly in implementing a new Marine Corps operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). The Navy's proposed FY2021 budget requests $30 million in research and development funding for initial industry studies and concept design work on the ship. The Navy envisions procuring the ships on an expedited schedule, with the first LAWs potentially being procured in FY2023 and a total of 28 notionally being procured by FY2026.The EABO concept was developed with an eye toward potential conflict scenarios with China in the Western Pacific. Underthe concept, the Marine Corps envisions, among other things, having reinforced-platoon-sized Marine Corps units maneuveraround the theater, moving from island to island, to fire anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perform other missions so asto contribute, alongside Navy and other U.S. military forces, to U.S. operations to counter and deny sea control to Chineseforces. The LAW ships would be instrumental to these operations, with LAWs embarking, transporting, landing, andsubsequently reembarking these small Marine Corps units.As conceived by the Navy and Marine Corps, LAWs would be much smaller and individually much less expensive to procureand operate than the Navy's current amphibious ships. The Navy wants LAWs to be 200 to 400 feet in length, and to have aunit procurement cost of $100 million to $130 million.The LAW as outlined by the Navy is small enough that it could be built by any of several U.S. shipyards. The Navy statesthat in response to an initial request for information (RFI) about the LAW, it received responses from 13 firms, includingnine shipyards. The Navy's baseline preference is to have a single shipyard build all 28 to 30 ships, but the Navy is open tohaving them built in multiple yards to the same design if doing so could permit the program to be implemented more quickly and/or less expensively.

Background and Issues for Congress

Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program

Contents: (1) Scope, Sources, and Terminology; (2) Overview of China¿s Naval Modern.; Inception; Elements of Modern. Effort; Limitations and Weaknesses; Reasons for Modern. Effort; Elements of China¿s Naval Modern.; Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles; Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles; Subs.; Aircraft Carriers; Surface Combatants; Amphibious Ships; Maritime Surveill. and Targeting Systems; Operations Away From Home Waters; Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities; Potential Oversight Issues for Congress; China as a Defense-Planning Priority; (3) Potential Navy-Related Program Implications; Highly Capable Ships and Aircraft; Pacific Fleet¿s Share of the Navy; Homeporting Pacific Fleet Ships in Forward Locations; Larger vs. Smaller Ships.

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U. S. Navy Capabilities

Contents: (1) Intro.: Alternate Engine Program; (2) Background: The F-35 In Brief; Three Versions; Alternate Engine Program; Program Origin and Milestones; Procurement Quantities; Program Mgmt.; Internat. Participation; Cost and Funding; Mfg. Locations; Proposed FY 2010 Budget; Proposed Termination of Alternate Engine; (3) Issues for Congress: Alternate Engine Program; Summary of Arguments; Admin. Perspective; Studies on F-35 Alternate Engine; Recent Developments; Development Status and Readiness for Production; Admin. Perspective; Affordability and Projected Fighter Shortfalls; Implications for Industrial Base; (4) Legislative Activity for FY 2010; Summary of Quantities and Funding; FY 2010 Defense Author. Bill. Illus.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The proposed FY 2010 defense budget requests $1,859.5 million for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. The issue for Congress discussed in this report is: What should be the role of sea-based systems in U.S. ballistic missile defense, and are DoD¿s programs for sea-based BMD capabilities appropriately structured and funded? Potential issues for Congress re: sea-based BMD systems include the number of SM-3 interceptors planned for procurement, whether development of a far-term sea-based terminal defense BMD capability should be accelerated, technical risk in the Aegis BMD program, the number of Aegis BMD ships, and the role of Aegis BMD in European missile defense. Illustrations.

Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense

The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region's future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. On January 21, 2015, President Obama issued an executive order for enhancing coordination of national efforts in the Arctic. The United States assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council on April 24, 2015, and will serve in that capacity for two years. Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the region, and national security. The five Arctic coastal states-the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of which Greenland is a territory)-have made or are in the process of preparing submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding the outer limits of their extended continental shelves. The Russian submission includes the underwater Lomonosov Ridge, a feature that spans a considerable distance across the Arctic Ocean. The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes-the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Current international guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters are being updated. Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more exploration for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to onshore exploration activities. Increased oil and gas exploration and tourism (cruise ships) in the Arctic increase the risk of pollution in the region. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies have yet to be developed. Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic. The United States is currently meeting with other countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. Changes in the Arctic could affect threatened and endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act, the polar bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. Arctic climate change is also expected to affect the economies, health, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples. Two of the Coast Guard's three polar icebreakers-Polar Star and Polar Sea-have exceeded their intended 30-year service lives, and Polar Sea is not operational. On May 12, 2011, representatives from the member states of the Arctic Council signed an agreement on cooperation on search and rescue in the Arctic. Although there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue. Some of the Arctic coastal states, particularly Russia, have announced an intention or taken actions to enhance their military presences in the high north. U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy and Coast Guard, have begun to pay more attention to the region in their planning and operations.

Changes in the Arctic

The Columbia (SSBN-826) class program is a program to design and build a class of 12 new ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy's current force of 14 aging Ohio-class SSBNs. The Navy has identified the Columbia-class program as the Navy's top priority program. The Navy wants to procure the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021. Research and development work on the program has been underway for several years, and advance procurement (AP) funding for the program began in FY2017. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,698.9 million in advance procurement (AP) funding and $533.1 million in research and development funding for the program. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission estimates the total procurement cost of the 12-ship class at $109.0 billion in then-year dollars. An April 2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated that the estimated total acquisition cost of the Columbia-class program is $102,075.3 million (about $102.1 billion) in constant FY2018 dollars, including $12,901.0 million (about $12.9 billion) in research and development costs and $89,174.3 million (about $89.2 billion) in procurement costs.

Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program

The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines(SSNs) since FY1998. The one Virginia-class boat that the Navy is requesting for procurement inFY2021 would be the 33rd boat in the class. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission had projectedthat the Navy would request two Virginia-class boats in FY2021.Virginia-class boats scheduled for procurement in FY2019-FY2023 are being procured under amultiyear procurement (MYP) contract. Most Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019 andsubsequent years are to be built with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-footlong, mid-body section equipped with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing andlaunching additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads.The Navy's force-level goal for SSNs is to achieve and maintain a force of 66 boats. The Navy'sSSN force included 50 boats at the end of FY2019. From the mid-2020s through the early 2030s, the number of SSNs is projected to experience a valley or trough, reaching a minimum of 42boats in FY2027-FY2028. Some observers are concerned that this projected valley could lead to aperiod of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakenedconventional deterrence against potential adversaries such as China. The projected SSN valleywas first identified by CRS in 1995 and has been discussed in CRS reports and testimony everyyear since then. The Navy's FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan projects that, after reaching itsprojected 42-boat minimum, the SSN force will increase to 66 boats by FY2048

Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement

Congressional Research Service: The Libr

Some Members of Congress this year have expressed interest in the option of procuring a 10th San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship in FY2009, so as to help meet the Marine Corps' goal for amphibious lift capability. The Navy's proposed FY2009 budget does not request funding for a 10th LPD-17 and instead proposes ending LPD-17 procurement with the ninth ship, which was procured in FY2008. The Navy's planned 313-ship fleet calls for a 31-ship amphibious force that includes 10 LPD-17s, and the Marine Corps states that a 33-ship amphibious force that includes 11 LPD-17s would be required to fully meet the Marine Corps' amphibious lift goal. Procurement of a 10th LPD-17 is the Number 2 item on the Navy's FY2009 Unfunded Requirements List (URL) and the Number 1 item on the Marine Corps' FY2009 URL. Fully funding the procurement of a 10th LPD-17 in FY2009, the Navy and Marine Corps FY2009 URLs state, would cost $1,700 million. Congress, as part of its action on the FY2008 defense budget, provided $50 million in advance procurement funding for a 10th LPD-17. The Marine Corps' goal for amphibious lift is to have a force of amphibious ships with enough combined lift capacity for ...

Navy Lpd-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement

Crs Report for Congress

he Navy wants to procure a total of 13 LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ships. LPD-17 Flight II ships cost roughly $1.8 billion each to procure. The first LPD-17 Flight II ship, LPD-30, was procured in FY2018. As part of its action on the Navy's proposed FY2019 budget, Congress provided $350 million in unrequested advance procurement (AP) funding for a second LPD-17 Flight II ship, LPD-31, to be procured in FY2020. This was consistent with the Navy's FY2019 budget submission, under which LPD-31 was planned for procurement in FY2020 and the remainder of its procurement cost was to be requested in FY2020. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission, however, proposes deferring the procurement of LPD-31 by one year, to FY2021, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget, rather than requesting the remainder of LPD-31's procurement cost, instead requests $247.1 million in AP funding for the ship. Navy officials state that if no LPD-17 Flight II ship is procured in FY2020, the $350 million in FY2019 AP funding that Congress provided for the LPD-17 program would become unexecutable, because that funding was provided specifically for use in building an LPD-17 Flight II ship procured in FY2020, not an LPD-17 Flight II ship procured in FY2021. The $350 million in FY2019 AP funding can be made executable by procuring LPD-31 in FY2020 or by passing legislation permitting the FY2019 AP funding to be used for an LPD-17 Flight II ship procured in FY2021. One alternative for procuring LPD-31 in FY2020 would be to do so with full funding (i.e., with the remainder of the ship's procurement cost provided in FY2020). Another alternative would be to pass legislation giving the Navy the authority to procure LPD-31 in FY2020 using incremental funding. Navy officials state that under the latter alternative, the amount of procurement funding needed for LPD-31 in FY2020 would be, at a minimum, roughly $200 million, and not more than the requested amount of $247.1 million.

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

The Navy¿s FY 2011-2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring an 11th and final San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship in FY 2012. The Navy estimates the procurement cost of this ship at $2 billion. The ship received $184 million in FY 2010 advance procurement funding, and the Navy plans to request the remaining $1.9 billion of the cost in the FY 2012 budget. Accordingly, the Navy¿s proposed FY 2011 budget does not request any procurement funding for the LPD-17 program. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Amphibious Ships in General; LPD-17 Program; (3) Issues for Congress. Appendix A. Amphibious Lift Goal; Appendix B. LPD-17 Cost Growth and Construction Problems. Illus. This is a print on demand report.

Background, Issues, and Options for Congress

Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement

The Navy procured 18 Ohio (SSBN-726) class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) between FY1974 and FY1991 to serve as part of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force. They are commonly called Trident submarines because they carry Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The first Trident entered service in 1981, the 18th in 1997. The first 8 (SSBNs 726 through 733) were originally armed with Trident I (C4) SLBMs; the final 10 (SSBNs 734 through 743) were armed with larger and more powerful Trident II (D5) SLBMs. The boats were originally designed for a 30-year life but were later certified for a 42-year life, composed of 20 years of operation, a two-year mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul, and then another 20 years of operation. The FY2006 budget completed the funding required in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account for the Navy's program to refuel and convert four Trident ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) into cruise-missile-carrying and special operations forces (SOF) support submarines (SSGNs). Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the program was declared on November 1, 2007. The total estimated cost of the program is about $4.0 billion. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program

The Navy's FY2011 budget proposes canceling the CG(X) program as unaffordable and instead building an improved version of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyer called the Flight III version. This report provides background information on the CG(X) program as it existed prior to its proposed cancellation. For further discussion of the proposal to build Flight III DDG-51s in lieu of CG(X)s, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress.

Background for Congress

Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program

Kenneth Katzman

Michael Ratner

Neelesh Nerurkar

Some officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have recently renewed threats to close or exercise control over the Strait of Hormuz. This report explains Iranian threats to the Strait of Hormuz, and analyzes the implications of some scenarios for potential U.S. or international conflict with Iran, which include: outright closure of the Strait, harassment and/or infrastructure damage, and continued threat.

Iran's Threat to the Strait of Hormuz

Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition

The Navy began procuring Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers, also known as Aegis destroyers, in FY1985, and a total of 85 have been procured through FY2020, including three in FY2020. The Navy's proposed FY2021 budget requests funding for the procurement of two more DDG-51s, which would be the 86th and 87th ships in the class.DDG-51s are being procured in FY2018-FY2022 under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract that Congress approved as part of its action on the Navy's FY2018 budget. DDG-51s procured in FY2017 and subsequent years are being built to a revised design, called the Flight III design, that incorporates a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) or SPY-6 radar.The Navy wants to procure the first ship of a new class of large surface combatants in FY2028. Under the Navy's plan, FY2027 would be the final year of DDG-51 procurement.

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs

The LCS is a relatively inexpensive Navy surface combatant equipped with modular ¿plug-and-fight¿ mission packages. The basic version of the LCS, without any mission packages, is referred to as the LCS sea frame. The Navy wants to field a force of 55 LCSs. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: The LCS in General; Two Industry Teams, Each with Its Own Design; Planned Procurement Quantities; (3) Issues for Congress: New Acquisition Strategy Announced in 9/09; Unit Procurement Cost Cap; Total Program Acquisition Cost; (4) Legislative Activity for FY 2011. Appendices: Cost Growth on LCS Sea Frames; LCS Acquisition Strategy Announced in 9/09. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand publication.

Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program

Of the Coast Guard¿s (CG) 3 polar icebreakers, 2 ¿ Polar Star and Polar Sea ¿ have exceeded their intended 30-year service lives. Potential policy issues for Congress regarding CG polar icebreaker modernization include: the numbers and capabilities of polar icebreakers the CG will need in the future; whether to provide these icebreakers through construction of new ships or service life extensions of Polar Start and/or Polar Sea; whether new ships should be funded entirely in the Coast Guard budget, or partly or entirely in some other part of the fed. budget; and whether the Polar Star should be repaired and placed back into service. Charts and tables.

Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Background: Proposed 313-Ship Fleet; FY 2010 Shipbuilding Request; (3) Oversight Issues for Congress: Adequacy of Proposed 313-Ship Fleet: Adequacy of Shipbuilding Plan for Maintaining 313 Ships; Shortfalls Relative to 313-Ship Goals; Affordability of Shipbuilding Plan; (4) Legislative Activity for FY 2010: FY 2010 Defense Authorization Act; FY 2010 DoD Appropriations Act; Resolution Directing Submission of FY 2010 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan; Legislation on Individual Shipbuilding Programs. Appendixes: (A) December 2009 Press Reports About Draft FY 2011 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan; (B) Adequacy of Planned 313-Ship Fleet; (C) Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate. Charts and tables.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans

Michael Moodie

The U.S. role in the world refers to the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country's overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage. While descriptions of the U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in their specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements: global leadership; defense and promotion of the liberal international order; defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia. The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world is changing, and if so, what implications this might have for the United States and the world. A change in the U.S. role could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights. Some observers, particularly critics of the Trump Administration, argue that under the Trump Administration, the United States is substantially changing the U.S. role in the world. Other observers, particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, while acknowledging that the Trump Administration has changed U.S. foreign policy in a number of areas compared to policies pursued by the Obama Administration, argue that under the Trump Administration, there has been less change and more continuity regarding the U.S. role in the world. Some observers who assess that the United States under the Trump Administration is substantially changing the U.S. role in the world-particularly critics of the Trump Administration, and also some who were critical of the Obama Administration-view the implications of that change as undesirable. They view the change as an unnecessary retreat from U.S. global leadership and a gratuitous discarding of long-held U.S. values, and judge it to be an unforced error of immense proportions-a needless and self-defeating squandering of something of great value to the United States that the United States had worked to build and maintain for 70 years. Other observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent years-particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, but also some observers who were arguing even prior to the Trump Administration in favor of a more restrained U.S. role in the world-view the change in the U.S. role, or at least certain aspects of it, as helpful for responding to changed U.S. and global circumstances and for defending U.S. interests. Congress's decisions regarding the U.S role in the world could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking.

Ronald O'Rourke

About

Books

Join the club