Russell W. Glenn

The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which began on July 24, 2003, has been a remarkable success, in part because of the consistency of its message, the strength of its leadership, and its uncommon support for, rather than overt control of, the Solomon Islands government and policing capability. This study reviews RAMSI operations through the lens of a broader application to current and future counterinsurgency efforts.

Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube

Todd C. Helmus

Christopher Paul

Virtually every action, message, and decision of a military force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population: strategic communication, treatment of civilians at vehicle checkpoints, and the accuracy or inaccuracy of aerial bombardment. Themes of U.S. goodwill mean little if its actions convey otherwise. Consequently, a unified message in both word and deed is fundamental to success. Business marketing practices provide a useful framework for improving U.S. military efforts to shape the attitudes and behaviors of local populations in a theater of operations as well as those of a broader, international audience. Enlisting Madison Avenue extracts lessons from these business practices and adapts them to U.S. military efforts, developing a unique approach to shaping that has the potential to improve military-civilian relations, the accuracy of media coverage of operations, communication of U.S. and coalition objectives, and the reputation of U.S. forces in theater and internationally. Foremost among these lessons are the concepts of branding, customer satisfaction, and segmentation of the target audience, all of which serve to maximize the impact and improve the outcome of U.S. shaping efforts.

The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation

Enlisting Madison Avenue

Scott Gerwehr

Deception is a powerful yet understudied instrument of war. Using the extensive literature on deception in the animal kingdom, where ruses of near-infinite variety are applied to offense, defense, and intelligence gathering, the authors delve into the theory of deception to reveal new avenues of experimentation. These pathways may lead to new technologies or training techniques and provoke a new look at deception doctrine applicable at every level of war. ISBN: 0-8330-3159-7 Price: $24.00 Page count: 98

Deception and Adaptation in Future Urban Operations

Unweaving the Web

Israel's is a state of continuous conflict, frequently of the armed variety, and not uncommonly achieving levels of violence that qualify as war. Significant spikes in that level of violence have occurred several times during the past decade alone. These include - but are by no means limited to - the Second Lebanon War (July-August 2006), Operation Cast Lead (December 2008-January 2009), and Operation Protective Edge (July-August 2014). The third of these constitutes the focus of this study while the two preceding help to establish a foundation for considering that most recent spike in violence. This analysis will identify of issues relevant to assisting the Australian Army's preparation for future conflict. Much of the analysis will additionally be of interest to Australian policymakers, the country's multinational partners, and students of contemporary conflict. Some of the following pages' observations will suggest areas of greater cooperation between the army and its joint, multinational, and civilian whole-of-government partners. A few reach so far as to potentially influence relationships with nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), and industry representatives.

Implications of Israel's 2014 Operation Protective Edge for the Australian Army

Short War in a Perpetual Conflict

This research was undertaken to gain a better understanding of the relationship between deception and the urban environment, first to explore the power of deception when employed against U.S. forces in urban operations, and second to evaluate the potential value of deception when used by U.S. forces in urban operations.

Deception and Urban Operations

The Art of Darkness

Glenn first surveyed members of the 1st Cavalry Division who fought in Vietnam, then polled a sample of officers currently on active duty to validate the results. His findings demonstrate that contrary to popular perception, nearly all American combatants met the fundamental demand of combat: engage the enemy when called upon. This is a far different statistic from the 25 percent commonly attributed to U.S. ground forces in World War II.".

Men Against Fire in Vietnam

Reading Athena's Dance Card

This book critically examines the Western approach to counter-insurgency in the post-colonial era and offers a series of recommendations to address current shortfalls. The author argues that current approaches to countering insurgency rely too heavily on conflicts from the post-World War II years of waning colonialism. Campaigns conducted over half a century ago – Malaya, Aden, and Kenya among them – remain primary sources on which the United States, British, Australian, and other militaries build their guidance for dealing with insurgent threats, this though both the character of those threats and the conflict environment are significantly different than was the case in those earlier years. This book addresses the resulting inconsistencies by offering insights, analysis, and recommendations drawn from campaigns more applicable to counter-insurgency today. Eight post-colonial conflicts; to include Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Iraq; provide the basis for analysis. All are examples in which counterinsurgents attained or continue to demonstrate considerable progress when taking on enterprises better known for disaster and disappointment. Recommendations resulting from these analyses challenge entrenched beliefs to serve as the impetus for essential change. Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgencies, military and strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.

Lessons From Post-Colonial Conflict

Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency

The Australian National University’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) is Australia’s premier university-based strategic studies think tank. Fifty years after the Centre was founded in 1966, SDSC celebrated its continued research, publications, teaching and government advisory role with a two-day conference entitled ‘New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0’. The event saw the podium graced by many of the world’s premier thinkers in the strategic studies field. An evening between those tours to the lectern brought together academics, practitioners and other honoured guests at a commemorative dinner held beneath the widespread wings of the ‘G for George’ bomber in the Australian War Memorial—an event that included SDSC’s own Professor Desmond Ball AO making his last public appearance. Since SDSC’s 25th anniversary, the world has seen the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Bipolarity gave way to the emergence of the United States as the world’s sole superpower, a status many now see as under threat. Both the nature of the threats and identity of individual competitors has changed in the interim quarter-century. Non-state actors are presenting rising challenges to national governments. Meanwhile, a diminished Russia and far more wealthy China seek to reassert themselves. Never before has the call for reasoned innovative security studies thinking been more pronounced. Rarely has a group so able to offer that thought come together as was the case in July 2016. This book encapsulates the essence of this cutting-edge thinking and is a must read for those concerned with emerging strategic challenges facing Australia and its security partners.

Russell W. Glenn

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