Susan Rose-Ackerman

This collection of articles offers a comprehensive assessment of the subtle but nevertheless pervasive economic infrastructure of corruption. It provides suitable core or adjunct reading for law school, graduate, and undergraduate courses on international economics, international relations and international law. American Society of International Law This exhaustive collection, edited by Rose-Ackerman, cannot be called anything but excellent. . . . Overall, a wonderful addition to the literature. Highly recommended. C.J. Talele, Choice Susan Rose-Ackerman is a world-class economist and an authority on the economics of corruption. This is a fine reference volume that every economist interested in this important subject will want to have as a ready reference. Jagdish Bhagwati, Columbia University, US Economic research on corruption aims both to isolate the economic effects of quid pro quo deals between agents and third parties, and to suggest how legal and institutional reforms might curb harms and enhance benefits. In this comprehensive Handbook, top scholars in the field provide specially commissioned essays, both theoretical and empirical, exploring both types of research. The Handbook begins with an introductory essay by the editor, followed by two chapters written by leading exponents of cross-country research. However, the focus of the Handbook is on research at the micro level, where policy can be made and evaluated. These microeconomic studies fall into several overlapping categories. The first group includes studies that link corrupt incentives to institutional structures, particularly the organization of the state. The second draws implications from surveys of households or businesses and from controlled experiments. The third concentrates on particular sectors such as education, tax administration, public works, customs services, and pharmaceuticals. Finally, two chapters assess corruption in the transition away from socialism in Europe and Asia.

International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption

Blake Emerson

Peter L. Lindseth

A comprehensive overview of the field of comparative administrative law that builds on the first edition with many new and revised chapters, additional topics and extended geographical coverage. This Research Handbook’s broad, multi-method approach combines history and social science with more strictly legal analyses. This new edition demonstrates the growth and dynamism of recent efforts – spearheaded by the first edition – to stimulate comparative research in administrative law and public law more generally, reaching across different countries and scholarly disciplines.

Second Edition

Comparative Administrative Law

The countries of Central Europe in the first round for admission to the European Union have all established constitutional, electoral democracies and market economies. However, much remains to be done to achieve fully consolidated democratic states. This study documents the weaknesses of public oversight and participation in policymaking in Hungary and Poland, two of the most advanced countries in the region. It discusses five alternative routes to accountability including European Union oversight, constitutional institutions such as presidents and courts, devolution to lower-level governments, the use of neo-corporatist bodies, and open-ended participation rights. It urges more emphasis on the fifth option, public participation. Case studies of the environmental movement in Hungary and of student groups in Poland illustrate these general points. The book reviews the United States' experience of open-ended public participation and draws some lessons for the transition countries from the strengths and weaknesses of the American system.

Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland

From Elections to Democracy

A defense of regulatory agencies’ efforts to combine public consultation with bureaucratic expertise to serve the interest of all citizens The statutory delegation of rule-making authority to the executive has recently become a source of controversy. There are guiding models, but none, Susan Rose-Ackerman claims, is a good fit with the needs of regulating in the public interest. Using a cross-national comparison of public policy-making in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, she argues that public participation inside executive rule-making processes is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of regulatory policy-making.

Policymaking Accountability in the US, the UK, Germany, and France

Democracy and Executive Power

Paul Lagunes

What makes the control of corruption so difficult and contested? Drawing on the insights of political science, economics and law, the expert contributors to this book offer diverse perspectives. One group of chapters explores the nature of corruption in d

Essays in Political Economy

Greed, Corruption, and the Modern State

Corruption: A Study in Political Economy focuses on the problem of corruptions in political economy and functional bribery. This book is organized into four parts encompassing 11 chapters. Chapters 2 to 4 deal with the fundamental relationship among voters, legislators, and interest groups, as well as the role of the government bureaucracy in shaping legislative choices. Chapters 5 illustrates the basic relationships with an analysis of a monopolistic government official charged with allocating a benefit through a queuing system, while Chapter 6 retains the assumption of a single official with monopoly power but moves beyond the queuing model to consider alternative sanctioning strategies, a wider variety of bureaucratic tasks, and bribers who may be competitively or monopolisticly organized. Chapters 7 and 8 explore the potential of a system where officials are permitted to compete with one another in processing applications for governmental benefits. Under this system, an individual or firm rejected by one official can seek the benefit from other bureaucrats. Chapter 9 introduces a final administrative variable into the analysis, while Chapter 10 discusses the governmental corruption to analogous corrupt activities entirely within the private sector. Lastly, Chapter 11 looks into the relation between corruption and democratic theory, the possibility of reforming corrupt bureaucracies, and the link between economics and morality. This book will be of value to public servants, legislators, economists, sociologists, and researchers.

A Study in Political Economy

Corruption

Donatella Della Porta

Corruption undermines the market and challenges government legitimacy. Its hidden character, however, makes it troublesome to study empirically. Corrupt Exchanges seeks to overcome this difficulty using the tools of economics and political science. The papers, presented at the Zentrum for InterdisziplinÃ¤re Forschung in Bielefeld, Germany, in 2001, begin a dialogue across disciplinary lines. The contributors are a first-rate group of scholars using diverse techniques, both qualitative and quantitative. Their work demonstrates that, with patience and creativity, the empirical study of corruption is possible and can contribute to the policy debate. One group of papers deals with high-level political corruption especially involving Member States of the European Union. The second group focuses on bureaucratic corruption in developing and transition countries. The papers study particular instances and types of corruption and suggest solutions. This book will interest to those concerned with limiting corruption worldwide, including the business and the nonprofit communities and international aid and lending organizations. The editors are internationally recognized experts in the study of corruption. Donatella Della Porta is Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence and the author (with Alberto Vannucci) of Corrupt Exchanges (1999). Susan Rose-Ackerman is Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University and the author of Corruption and Government (1999).

Empirical Themes in the Politics and Political Economy of Corruption

Corrupt Exchanges

Bonnie J. Palifka

The second edition of Corruption and Government updates Susan Rose-Ackerman's 1999 book to address emerging issues and to rethink old questions in light of new data. The book analyzes the research explosion that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall, the founding of Transparency International, and the World Bank's decision to give anti-corruption policy a key place on its agenda. Time has vindicated Rose-Ackerman's emphasis on institutional reform as the necessary condition for serious progress. The book deals with routine payoffs and with corruption in contracting and privatization. It gives special attention to political corruption and to instruments of accountability. The authors have expanded the treatment of culture as a source of entrenched corruption and added chapters on criminal law, organized crime, and post-conflict societies. The book outlines domestic conditions for reform and discusses international initiatives - including both explicit anti-corruption policies and efforts to constrain money laundering.

Causes, Consequences, and Reform

Corruption and Government

Tina Søreide

ÔVolume Two of the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption presents a comprehensive, detailed, and in-depth analysis of corruption as well as its economic and policy implications. . . It will be a valuable resource not only for experts and students of corruption studies, but also for public officials, NGO employees, and scholars of economic and political development throughout the world.Õ Ð Ararat L. Osipian, Journal of Economic Issues A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs. Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions. This cutting-edge work will be an unmatched resource for scholars and students of corruption, professionals in international aid and finance organizations, and scholars and professionals with more general interests in economic and political development.

This new edition of a 1999 classic shows how institutionalized corruption can be fought through sophisticated political-economic reform.

John C. Coffee, Jr.

Louis Lowenstein

Dramatic as the corporate takeovers of recent years have been, it is far from clear what underlying forces are at work, and what their long-term consequences will be. This book represents one of the first sustained efforts to examine the complex issues surrounding the corporate takeover. Based on papers presented at a symposium sponsored by Columbia Law School's Center for Law and Economic Studies, it airs new theories and offers vital insights into events that have become central to American corporate culture.

Susan Rose-Ackerman

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