Strategic Studies Institute

Thomas R. Mockaitis

The Future of Counterinsurgency and U. S. Land Power

COIN Conundrum

This concise biography of the world's most notorious terrorist tells the fascinating story of the evolution of a wealthy businesman's son to the 9/11 mastermind who declared war on America. Osama bin Laden: A Biography offers a concise, fact-based portrait of a man whose rise from obscurity to notoriety coincides with some of the most traumatic events of the 21st century. It follows bin Laden's story from his life in Saudi society in the 1960s and 1970s to his religious conversion, his emergence as a jihadist leader, his horrifying terrorist attacks, and his near-mythic status in parts of the Muslim world today. Drawing on a wide range of sources, Osama bin Laden finds the political and religious roots of a worldview that combines devout faith with a belief in violence and terrorism. The book pays particular attention to the spread of radical Islam from Egypt to Saudi Arabia and beyond, as well as the development of Al Qaeda and its current scope and capabilities.

A Biography

Osama bin Laden

This Letort Paper covers U.S. military interventions in civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War. It defines intervention as the use of military force to achieve a specific objective (i.e., deliver humanitarian aid, support revolutionaries or insurgents, protect a threatened population, etc.) and focuses on the phase of the intervention in which kinetic operations occurred. The analysis considers five conflicts in which the United States intervened: Somalia (1992-93), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), and Libya (2011). It also reviews two crises in which Washington might have intervened but chose not to: Rwanda (1994) and Syria (2011-12). The author examines each case using five broad analytical questions: 1. Could the intervention have achieved its objective at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure? 2. What policy considerations prompted the intervention? 3. How did the United States intervene? 4. Was the intervention followed by a Phase 4 stability operation? and, 5. Did Washington have a viable exit strategy? From analysis of these cases, the author derives lessons that may guide policy makers in deciding when, where, and how to intervene in the future.

Conducting Effective Interventions

Avoiding the Slippery Slope

As shocking as the attacks of 9/11 were, we have been too quick to view the post-9/11 struggle against terrorism as entirely new and unprecedented. Without denying certain novel aspects of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, the "newness" of its purpose and methods has been overemphasized. Many aspects of contemporary terrorism bear a striking resemblance to past movements. Others represent the culmination of trends evolving over decades. Even seemingly novel characteristics of terrorist methods may be more the outcome of earlier developments than a truly new phenomenon. The increased lethality of terrorist attacks is a case in point. Usually attributed to lack of restraint brought on by religious extremism, the emphasis on body count may owe as much to a kind of threshold phenomenon. Numbed by decades of violence, people do not shock as easily as they once did. It now takes thousands of deaths to produce the same effect once caused by a relative handful. This book examines the nature of the contemporary threat within a historical context to discern continuities and change in terrorist behavior. It challenges the idea of a global war on terrorism and suggests that the United States, or any threatened country, would be better served by a policy aimed at reducing the risk of terrorist attack to an acceptable level at a reasonable cost. The book concludes by proposing a workable strategy for achieving this reasonable level of security.

Myths and Reality

The "new" Terrorism

Based upon consideration of United Nation missions to the Congo (1960-64), Somalia (1992-95), and the former Yugoslavia (1992-95) and examination of counterinsurgency campaigns, Mockaitis develops a new model for intervening in intrastate conflicts and commends the British approach to civil strife as the basis for a new approach to peace operations. Both contemporary and historic examples demonstrate that military intervention to end civil conflict differs radically from traditional peacekeeping. Ending a civil war requires the selective and limited use of force to stop the fighting, safeguard humanitarian aid work, and restore law and order. Since intrastate conflict resembles insurgency far more than it does any other type of war, counterinsurgency principles should form the basis of a new intervention model. A comprehensive approach to resolve intrastate conflict requires that peace forces, NGOs, and local authorities cooperate in rebuilding a war-torn country. Only the British have enjoyed much success in counterinsurgency campaigns. Starting from the three broad principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, and flexibility, the British approach in responding to insurgency has combined the limited use of force with political and civil development. Carefully considered and correctly applied, these principles could produce a more effective model for peace operations to end intrastate conflict.

The Sword Or the Olive Branch?

Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict

A concise biography of the world's most notorious terrorist tells the story of the evolution of a wealthy businesman's son to the 9/11 mastermind who declared war on America.

Thomas R. Mockaitis

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