Thomas Scanlon

How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism. Scanlon bases his contractualism on a broader account of reasons, value, and individual well-being that challenges standard views about these crucial notions. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon is a pluralist about both moral and non-moral values. He argues that, taking this plurality of values into account, contractualism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong.

What We Owe to Each Other

Inequality is widely regarded as morally objectionable: T. M. Scanlon investigates why it matters to us. He considers the nature and importance of equality of opportunity, whether the pursuit of greater equality involves objectionable interference with individual liberty, and whether the rich can be said to deserve their greater rewards.

Why Does Inequality Matter?

Thomas Nagel

Marshall Cohen

Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Law Dean Emeritus of the College of Letters Arts and Sciences Marshall Cohen

These essays, with one exception originally published in Philosophy & Public Affairs, consider the moral problems associated with improving the social and economic position of disadvantaged groups. If the situation of women and minorities improves so that their opportunities are equal to those of more favored groups, will they then be in a competitive position conducive to equal achievement? If not, can preferential hiring or preferential admission to educational institutions be justified? The contributors explore the complexities of this problem from several points of view. The discussions in Part I are more theoretical and concentrate on the application to this case of general considerations from ethical theory. The discussions in Part II also take up theoretical questions, but they start from specific problems about the constitutionality and the effectiveness of certain methods of achieving equality and counteracting discrimination. The two groups of essays demonstrate admirably the close connection between moral philosophy and questions of law and policy. The issues discussed include compensation, liability, victimization, the significance of group membership, the intrinsic importance of racial, sexual, or meritocratic criteria, and the overall effects of preferential policies.

Thomas Scanlon

About

Books

Join the club