Stephan De Spiegeleire

Tim Sweijs

Matthijs Maas

Artificial intelligence (AI) is on everybody’s minds these days. Most of the world’s leading companies are making massive investments in it. Governments are scrambling to catch up. Every single one of us who uses Google Search or any of the new digital assistants on our smartphones has witnessed first-hand how quickly these developments now go. Many analysts foresee truly disruptive changes in education, employment, health, knowledge generation, mobility, etc. But what will AI mean for defense and security? In a new study HCSS offers a unique perspective on this question. Most studies to date quickly jump from AI to autonomous (mostly weapon) systems. They anticipate future armed forces that mostly resemble today’s armed forces, engaging in fairly similar types of activities with a still primarily industrial-kinetic capability bundle that would increasingly be AI-augmented. The authors of this study argue that AI may have a far more transformational impact on defense and security whereby new incarnations of ‘armed force’ start doing different things in novel ways. The report sketches a much broader option space within which defense and security organizations (DSOs) may wish to invest in successive generations of AI technologies. It suggests that some of the most promising investment opportunities to start generating the sustainable security effects that our polities, societies and economies expect may lie in in the realms of prevention and resilience. Also in those areas any large-scale application of AI will have to result from a preliminary open-minded (on all sides) public debate on its legal, ethical and privacy implications. The authors submit, however, that such a debate would be more fruitful than the current heated discussions about ‘killer drones’ or robots. Finally, the study suggests that the advent of artificial super-intelligence (i.e. AI that is superior across the board to human intelligence), which many experts now put firmly within the longer-term planning horizons of our DSOs, presents us with unprecedented risks but also opportunities that we have to start to explore. The report contains an overview of the role that ‘intelligence’ - the computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world - has played in defense and security throughout human history; a primer on AI (what it is, where it comes from and where it stands today - in both civilian and military contexts); a discussion of the broad option space for DSOs it opens up; 12 illustrative use cases across that option space; and a set of recommendations for - especially - small- and medium sized defense and security organizations.

Strategic Implications For Small- and Medium-Sized Force Providers

Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Defense

Willem Th. Oosterveld

Barin Kayaoğlu

Nicholas Farnham

Willem Bloem

Appearing seemingly out of nowhere over the course of 2013-14, the Islamic State, or Daesh, captured the attention of international audiences through widely broadcast acts of barbarity, followed by the proclamation of its own state and upending state borders in the process. The rise of the terror organization has prompted many questions: where did it originate from? How has it been able to establish itself so quickly? Can it actually persist? Can it be defeated? The aim of this year’s study, entitled “The Rise and Fall of ISIS: from Evitability to Inevitability”, is to understand the organization, its motivations, its inherent weaknesses, as well as its ability to endure. A broader aim is to set out how it could develop as it comes under ever more pressure by regional powers and, in the case of its defeat, how to prevent the arrival of the next ISIS. A key message of this chapter is that ISIS is a ‘child of its time’ and is not destined to persist. Its professed millenarian or eschatological bent is meant to cast the conflict between the Caliphate and the rest of the word as a cosmic battle, but in reality is largely of instrumental value. Also, while its rise could have been prevented, its fall looks all but inevitable, even if it remains unclear what will replace it. This study is part of the 2016-2017 HCSS StratMon.

From Evitability to Inevitability

The Rise and Fall of ISIS

Frank Bekkers

Stephan de Spiegeleire

National security starts with strategic anticipation: what are the risks for the Dutch national security? How can the Netherlands prepare for this, and what choices and investments are needed in order to do so?

Up and down, round and round, faster and faster

The wheel of fortune

Willem Oosterveld 

After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry expressed his indignation by stating that: “You just don’t in the 21st century behave in 19th century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped up pre-text,” This statement reflected a widely held view in the West that territorial conflict belongs to the past. The reality, unfortunately, is that territory is still seen by some to be at a premium for strategic, economic and other reasons. Territorial disputes continue to fuel contemporary militarized conflicts,1 and can be found in all parts of the world. Territory and war have been inextricably linked throughout the history of the Westphalian world system. Four out of every five wars fought between the end of the Thirty Years War (1648) and the Cold War (1989) involved territorial disputes. From the Congress of Vienna (1815) to the attacks of 9/11 (2001), almost one third of all interstate conflicts involved territorial conflict.2 In 2013, 51 out of 89 ongoing interstate conflicts involved territorial disputes.3 Indeed, in modern times, territorial ambitions do not cease to stir the hearts and minds of combatants from Latin America to East Asia. They have even been eating away at the fringes of Europe itself, seen by some as an island of ‘post-Westphalian’ tranquility.

Territorial Conflict in Today's World

Pushing the Boundaries

Kamal Eldin Salah

Marjolein de Ridder

Dana Poláčková

Scott Ward

Rik Rutten

Nathalie Olah 

Analyses of the international security environment typically provide somber overviews of the various drivers and manifestations of conflict and instability around the world. Recent developments such as the terrorist attacks in Paris, Beirut and elsewhere, a Middle East in flames, a resurgent Russia, incessant violence in West Africa or turmoil in South China Sea only reinforce this view. By framing our analysis of the security environment in these terms, debates about how to anticipate and respond to these current and future threats invariably focus on those forces of instability and conflict: how to identify threats and enemies and then eliminate them. This report is based on the premise that this conflict-centric mindset has led to portfolio choices in terms of strategies (‘what do we do and how do we do it?’), capabilities (‘what do we do it with?’), and partners (‘who do we do it with?’) that have been excessively onesided. This report argues that there is an alternative, complementary way of framing security that is equally real and equally actionable for defense and security organizations (DSOs4 ): a resilience-centric one.

INDIVIDUAL EMPOWERMENT, SOCIETAL RESILIENCE AND THE ARMED FORCES

SI VIS PACEM, PARA UTIQUE PACEM

The presence of peace is more than the absence of conflict. Analyses and evaluations of the state of the international security environment often focus solely on the most concerning developments and tend to fall back on various conflict-centric metrics when providing assessments of a given security landscape. This chapter, entitled “The Other Side of the Security Coin” investigates a number of positive socioeconomic trends occurring on a global level and how they can contribute to sustainable peace in the future. Improving citizens’ access to socioeconomic opportunities and livelihood-enhancing goods and services is a key factor in increasing the stake that citizens hold in the state of peace in their communities. Fitting within global trends such as the rise of the platform economy and social media, the role of technological and developmental processes improving individual empowerment will become more important for security and defense organizations in the near future. As to how we can leverage the dramatic changes ongoing throughout the world to better suit our security objectives remains yet to be seen. This study provides a brief overview of these trends and identifies the options for security and defense organizations to remain on top of them. This study is part of the 2016-2017 HCSS StratMon.

The Other Side of the Security Coin

Joshua Polchar

Philipp Marten

Jan Galdiga

Diversity and Military Effectiveness Improving inclusion for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) service members is more than a matter of ‘doing the right thing’: it is a matter of military effectiveness. A groundbreaking new report from The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, a defense think tank, argues that militaries must embrace diversity in order to survive and thrive in the twenty-first century security environment.

A Strategic Vision for Inclusion

LGBT Military Personnel

Frans Osinga

This open access volume surveys the state of the field to examine whether a fifth wave of deterrence theory is emerging. Bringing together insights from world-leading experts from three continents, the volume identifies the most pressing strategic challenges, frames theoretical concepts, and describes new strategies. The use and utility of deterrence in today’s strategic environment is a topic of paramount concern to scholars, strategists and policymakers. Ours is a period of considerable strategic turbulence, which in recent years has featured a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons used in defence postures across different theatres; a dramatic growth in the scale of military cyber capabilities and the frequency with which these are used; and rapid technological progress including the proliferation of long-range strike and unmanned systems. These military-strategic developments occur in a polarized international system, where cooperation between leading powers on arms control regimes is breaking down, states widely make use of hybrid conflict strategies, and the number of internationalized intrastate proxy conflicts has quintupled over the past two decades. Contemporary conflict actors exploit a wider gamut of coercive instruments, which they apply across a wider range of domains. The prevalence of multi-domain coercion across but also beyond traditional dimensions of armed conflict raises an important question: what does effective deterrence look like in the 21st century? Answering that question requires a re-appraisal of key theoretical concepts and dominant strategies of Western and non-Western actors in order to assess how they hold up in today’s world. Air Commodore Professor Dr. Frans Osinga is the Chair of the War Studies Department of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the Special Chair in War Studies at the University Leiden. Dr. Tim Sweijs is the Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Research Fellow at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda.

Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice

NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020

Rob Johnson

Martijn Kitzen

This book examines the key dimensions of 21st century war, and shows that orthodox thinking about war, particularly what it is and how it is fought, needs to be updated. Accelerating societal, economic, political and technological change affects how we prepare, equip and organise for war, as well as how we conduct war – both in its low-tech and high-tech forms, and whether it is with high intensity or low intensity. The volume examines changes in warfare by investigating the key features of the conduct of war during the first decades of the 21st century. Conceptually centred around the terms ‘kinetic’, ‘connected’ and ‘synthetic’, the analysis delves into a wide range of topics. The contributions discuss hybrid warfare, cyber and influence activities, machine learning and artificial intelligence, the use of armed drones and air power, the implications of the counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, as well as the consequences for law(fare) and decision making. This work will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, security studies and International Relations. Chapters 1, 2, 5, and 19 of this book are freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license available at https://www.routledge.com/The-Conduct-of-War-in-the-21st-Century-Kinetic-Connected-and-Synthetic/Johnson-Kitzen-Sweijs/p/book/9780367515249

Kinetic, Connected and Synthetic

The Conduct of War in the 21st Century

Stephan De Spiegeire

Peter Wijninga

As the NATO combat mission in Afghanistan draws to an end, the ‘West’ is starting to take a hard look back at two decades of global stabilization efforts. The ‘lessons learned’ literature on these efforts is exploding. One of the dominant themes in this literature is the need to embed the specifically military toolkit into a much more comprehensive, integrated approach towards planning and executing. In this forward-looking report, HCSS goes a step further by focusing not on the operational but on the strategic level of decision-making. Today, this strategic layer is driven much more by domestic and international ‘politicking’ than by creative strategic thinking. This report advocates a new approach to strategic decision-making which we label ‘strategic design’. It summarizes and borrows some key insights from the ‘design thinking’ literature in the business and public management literature and applies those to the security challenges surrounding stabilization efforts. The report then illustrates this approach by developing and evaluating a few ‘design sketches’ for new capability elements that even a small force provider like The Netherlands could start developing. The report might be of interest to strategic planners and decision-makers on both the military and civilians side

DESIGNING FUTURE STABILIZATION EFFORTS

Sijbren de Jong

Artur Usanov

Stephan De Spiegeleire 

Hannes Roos

Frank Bekkers 

Robert de Rave

Karlijn Jans 

Events unfolded once again at a swirling pace in 2016. Terrorists hit Europe’s capital in March. The British population voted for Brexit in June. Turkish armed forces failed to topple Erdoğan in July. A resurgent Russia flexed its military muscles again in the Middle East and actively interfered in American elections, in which the American population elected Trump, in November. We are worried but certainly not surprised by the volatility of contemporary international relations. In previous editions of our contribution to the Dutch government’s Strategic Monitor, we already observed a surge in assertive behavior, noted a dangerous uptick in crises, and warned for the contagiousness of political violence. The current volatility is not a coincidence, but rather the result of fundamental disturbances of the global order that are greatly amplified by rapid technological developments. Most mainstream explanations of recent turbulence focus on power transitions (the decline of the West and the rise of the rest), the concomitant return to more aggressive forms of power politics, and a backlash against globalization. What strikes us is that many of the explanations ignore what we consider one of the most striking mega trends that is reshaping the dynamics of power: the ongoing process of disintermediation. The StratMon 2016-2017 analyzes global trends in confrontation, cooperation and conflict based on different datasets. This year the report also contains case studies on Turkey, Moldova and The rise and fall of ISIS. Chapters analyzing the many faces of political violence and 'the other side of the security coin' are also included.

Volatility and friction in the age of disintermediation

Tim Sweijs

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