Torsten Persson

Below is a list of the prizewinners during the period 1991 ? 1995 with a description of the works which won them their prizes: (1991) R H COASE ? for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy; (1992) G S BECKER ? for having extended the domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behaviour and interaction, including nonmarket behaviour; (1993) R W FOGEL & D C NORTH ? for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change; (1994) J C HARSANYI, J F NASH & R SELTEN ? for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games; (1995) R E LUCAS ? for having developed and applied the hypothesis of rational expectations, and thereby having transformed macroeconomic analysis and deepened our understanding of economic policy.

Economic Sciences, 1991-1995

Guido Tabellini

What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis. Combining the best of three separate traditions—the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science—Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.

Explaining Economic Policy

Political Economics

Guido Enrico Tabellini

A broad empirical study of the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy and outcomes.

The Economic Effects of Constitutions

Below is a list of the prizewinners during the period 1996 ? 2000 with a description of the works which won them their prizes: (1996) J A MIRRLEES & W S VICKREY ? for their fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information; (1997) R C MERTON & M A SCHOLES ? for a new method to determine the value of derivatives; (1998) A K SEN ? for his contributions to welfare economics; (1999) R A MUNDELL ? for his analysis of monetary and fiscal policy under different exchange rate regimes and his analysis of optimum currency areas; (2000) J J HECKMAN ? for his development of theory and methods for analyzing selective samples & D L McFADDEN ? for his development of theory and methods for analyzing discrete choice.

Economic Sciences, 1996-2000

Timothy Besley

"Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things." So wrote Adam Smith a quarter of a millennium ago. Using the tools of modern political economics and combining economic theory with a bird's-eye view of the data, this book reinterprets Smith's pillars of prosperity to explain the existence of development clusters--places that tend to combine effective state institutions, the absence of political violence, and high per-capita incomes. To achieve peace, the authors stress the avoidance of repressive government and civil conflict. Easy taxes, they argue, refers not to low taxes, but a tax system with widespread compliance that collects taxes at a reasonable cost from a broad base, like income. And a tolerable administration of justice is about legal infrastructure that can support the enforcement of contracts and property rights in line with the rule of law. The authors show that countries tend to enjoy all three pillars of prosperity when they have evolved cohesive political institutions that promote common interests, guaranteeing the provision of public goods. In line with much historical research, international conflict has also been an important force behind effective states by fostering common interests. The absence of common interests and/or cohesive political institutions can explain the existence of very different development clusters in fragile states that are plagued by poverty, violence, and weak state capacity.

The Political Economics of Development Clusters

Pillars of Prosperity

This text illuminates the processes that cause prosperity and political order to develop together. It offers powerful insights into the divergent paths countries have taken and is a major contribution in the fields of political economy and development economics.

Torsten Persson

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