Gorka Navarrete

Vinod Goel

Ira A. Noveck

Jérôme Prado

Despite the centrality of rationality to our identity as a species (let alone the scientific endeavour), and the fact that it has been studied for several millennia, the present state of our knowledge of the mechanisms underlying logical reasoning remains highly fragmented. For example, a recent review concluded that none of the extant (12!) theories provide an adequate account (Khemlani & Johnson- Laird, 2011), while other authors argue that we are on the brink of a paradigm change, where the old binary logic framework will be washed away and replaced by more modern (and correct) probabilistic and Bayesian approaches (see for example Elqayam & Over, 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 2009; Over, 2009). Over the past 15 years neuroscience brain imaging techniques and patient studies have been used to map out the functional neuroanatomy of reasoning processes. The aim of this research topic is to discuss whether this line of research has facilitated, hindered, or has been largely irrelevant for understanding of reasoning processes. The answer is neither obvious nor uncontroversial. We would like to engage both the cognitive and the neuroscience community in this discussion. Some of the questions of interest are: How have the data generated by the patient and neuroimaging studies: • influenced our thinking about modularity of deductive reasoning • impacted the debate between mental logic theory, mental model theory and the dual mechanism accounts • affected our thinking about dual mechanism theories • informed discussion of the relationship between induction and deduction • illuminated the relationship between language, visual spatial processing and reasoning • affected our thinking about the unity of deductive reasoning processes Have any of the cognitive theories of reasoning helped us explain deficits in certain patient populations? Do certain theories do a better job of this than others? Is there any value to localizing cognitive processes and identifying dissociations (for reasoning and other cognitive processes)? What challenges have neuroimaging data raised for cognitive theories of reasoning? How can cognitive theory inform interpretation of patient data or neuroimaging data? How can patient data or neuroimaging data best inform cognitive theory? This list of questions is not exhaustive. Manuscripts addressing other related questions are welcome. We are interested in hearing from skeptics, agnostics and believers, and welcome original research contributions as well as reviews, methods, hypothesis & theory papers that contribute to the discussion of the current state of our knowledge of how neuroscience is (or is not) helping us to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms underlying logical reasoning processes. References Elqayam, S., & Over, D. E. (2012). Probabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: the paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning. Mind & Society, 11(1), 27–40. doi:10.1007/s11299-012-0102-4 Khemlani, S. S., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2011). Theories of the syllogism: A meta-analysis, (571). Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2009). Précis of bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. The Behavioral and brain sciences, 32(1), 69–84; discussion 85–120. doi:10.1017/S0140525X09000284 Over, D. E. (2009). New paradigm psychology of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 15(4), 431–438. doi:10.1080/13546780903266188

The Reasoning Brain: The Interplay between Cognitive Neuroscience and Theories of Reasoning

A new, biologically driven model of human behavior in which reason is tethered to the evolutionarily older autonomic, instinctive, and associative systems. In Reason and Less, Vinod Goel explains the workings of the tethered mind. Reason does not float on top of our biology but is tethered to evolutionarily older autonomic, instinctive, and associative systems. After describing the conceptual and neuroanatomical basis of each system, Goel shows how they interact to generate a blended response. Goel’s commonsense account drives human behavior back into the biology, where it belongs, and provides a richer set of tools for understanding how we pursue food, sex, and politics. Goel takes the reader on a journey through psychology (cognitive, behavioral, developmental, and evolutionary), neuroscience, philosophy, ethology, economics, and political science to explain the workings of the tethered mind. One key insight that holds everything together is that feelings—generated in old, widely conserved brain stem structures—are evolution’s solution to initiating and selecting all behaviors, and provide the common currency for the different systems to interact. Reason is as much about feelings as are lust and the taste of chocolate cake. All systems contribute to behavior and the overall control structure is one that maximizes pleasure and minimizes displeasure. Tethered rationality has some sobering and challenging implications for such real-world human behaviors as climate change denial, Trumpism, racism, or sexism. They cannot be changed simply by targeting beliefs but will require more drastic measures, the nature of which depends on the specific behavior in question. Having an accurate model of human behavior is the crucial first step.

Pursuing Food, Sex, and Politics

Reason and Less

Albrecht Müller

Britt Glatzeder

What is Thinking? – Trying to Define an Equally Fascinating and Elusive Phenomenon Human thinking is probably the most complex phenomenon that evolution has come up with until now. There exists a broad spectrum of definitions, from subs- ing almost all processes of cognition to limiting it to language-based, sometimes even only to formalizable reasoning processes. We work with a “medium sized” definition according to which thinking encompasses all operations by which cog- tive agents link mental content in order to gain new insights or perspectives. Mental content is, thus, a prerequisite for and the substrate on which thinking operations are executed. The largely unconscious acts of perceptual object stabilization, ca- gorization, emotional evaluation – and retrieving all the above from memory inscriptions – are the processes by which mental content is generated, and are, therefore, seen as prerequisites for thinking operations. In terms of a differentia specifica, the notion of “thinking” is seen as narrower than the notion of “cognition” and as wider than the notion of “reasoning”. Thinking is, thus, seen as a subset of cognition processes; and reasoning processes are seen as a subset of thinking. Besides reasoning, the notion of thinking includes also nonexplicit, intuitive, and associative processes of linking mental content. According to this definition, thinking is not dependant on language, i. e. also many animals and certainly all mammals show early forms of thinking.

Vinod Goel

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