Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

How to Reason and Argue

Think Again

Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development (Bradford Books)

Moral Psychology, Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality

Adaptations and Innateness (Bradford Books)

Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality

Attila Tugyan

Tanrısız ahlak?

Robert J. Fogelin

Now in its seventh edition, UNDERSTANDING ARGUMENTS has proven itself as an exceptional guide to understanding and constructing arguments in the context of a student's academic success and subsequent professional career. Its tried and true strengths include multiple approaches to the analysis of arguments, providing a variety of important tools; a thorough grounding on the uses of language in everyday discourse; and chapters in the latter half of the book that apply abstract concepts to concrete legal, moral, and scientific issues.

An Introduction to Informal Logic

Understanding Arguments

an introduction to informal logic

Understanding arguments

Fredrick Schauer

Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary

Philosophy of Law

Intuition and Diversity (Bradford Books)

Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality

Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Moral Psychology

A common refrain against atheism and secular humanism is that without belief in God, "everything is permitted." Walter Sinnott-Armstrong dismantles this argument and argues instead that God is not only not essential to morality, but that our moral behavior should be seen as utterly independent of religion. This short, accessible book is on a major aspect of the arguments against atheism and will interest those intrigued by the "new atheism" (Harris, Dawkins, etc).

Morality Without God?

Christian B. Miller

Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- 9.3 Circumstances and Responsibility in Psychopathy: Replies to Pickard and Graham -- Reply to Hanna Pickard -- Reply to George Graham -- References -- 10 Does Virtue Make Us Happy? A New Theory for an Old Question -- Constructivism and Well-Being -- Virtues and Values -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- 10.1 Who Does What? The Psychology-Philosophy Division of Labor on Virtue and Happiness -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- 10.2 A Tale of Two Default Approaches: Some Old Answers for a New Theory -- A Shifting Default Approach on Well-Being -- The Real Sticking Point: The Default Approach of Motivational Internalism -- Notes -- References -- 10.3 On the Division of Labor between Philosophers and Psychologists: A "Goldilocksian" Reply to Comments from Saucedo & Gruber -- Reply to Saucedo & Gruber -- Reply to Kristjánsson -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Contributors -- Index

Virtue and Character

A masterclass in persuasion from the inspiring philosopher who has taught a million people to argue through his popular open online course Our personal and political worlds are rife with arguments and disagreements, some of them petty and vitriolic. The inability to compromise and understand the other side is widespread today. What can we do to change this? In Think Again philosopher Walter Sinnott-Armstrong draws on a long tradition of logic to show why we should stop focusing on winning arguments and instead argue in a more constructive way. Based on a hugely popular online course with more than a million followers around the world, Think Again explains how to analyse, evaluate and make better arguments while also spotting bad reasoning and avoiding certain fallacies. Through lively, practical examples from everyday life, politics and popular culture, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong offers brilliantly straightforward, wise advice that we can all use at work, at home and online.

Lynn Nadel

We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action. Libet's striking results are often claimed to undermine traditional views of free will and moral responsibility and to have practical implications for criminal justice. His work has also stimulated a flurry of further fascinating scientific research--including findings in psychology by Dan Wegner and in neuroscience by John-Dylan Haynes--that raises novel questions about whether conscious will plays any causal role in action. Critics respond that both commonsense views of action and traditional theories of moral and legal responsibility, as well as free will, can survive the scientific onslaught of Libet and his progeny. To further this lively debate, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel have brought together prominent experts in neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and law to discuss whether our conscious choices really cause our actions, and what the answers to that question mean for how we view ourselves and how we should treat each other.

A Tribute to Benjamin Libet

Conscious Will and Responsibility

Nicholas Asher

Ruth Barcan Marcus

Chauncey Stillman Professor of Ethics in the Department of Philosophy and the Kenan Institute for Ethics Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Diana Raffman

Professor of Philosophy and Director of Graduate Studies Diana Raffman

This collection of original essays honours one of the most influential philosophical pioneers of the twentieth century, Ruth Barcan Marcus.

Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus

Modality, Morality and Belief

Construct effective arguments with UNDERSTANDING ARGUMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMAL LOGIC, International Edition. Primarily an introduction to informal logic, this text provides a guide to understanding and constructing arguments in the context of academic studies and subsequent professional careers. Exercises, discussion questions, chapter objectives, and readings help clarify difficult concepts and make the material meaningful and useful.

William Lane Craig

The question of whether or not God exists is profoundly fascinating and important. Now two articulate spokesmen--one a Christian, the other an atheist--duel over God's existence in an illuminating battle of ideas. In God? A Debate between a Christian and an Atheist, William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong bring to the printed page two debates they held before live audiences, preserving all the wit, clarity, and immediacy of their public exchanges. Avoiding overly esoteric arguments, they directly address issues such as religious experience, the Bible, evil, eternity, the origin of the universe, design, and the supposed connection between morality and the existence of God. Employing sharp and humorous arguments, each philosopher strikes quickly to the heart of his opponent's case. For example, Craig claims that we must believe in God in order to explain objective moral values, such as why rape is wrong. Sinnott-Armstrong responds that what makes rape wrong is the harm to victims of rape, so rape is immoral even if there is no God. By assuming a traditional concept of God in their discussion, the authors ensure that they are truly addressing each other's viewpoints and engaging in a disagreement over a unified issue. The book is composed of six chapters that alternate between Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong, so that each separate point can be discussed as it arises. Ideal for courses in the philosophy of religion and introduction to philosophy, this lively and direct dialogue will stimulate students and anyone interested in the existence of God, regardless of whether or not they believe in God.

A Debate between a Christian and an Atheist

God?

Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls "moderate moral skepticism," which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified.

Moral Skepticism

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The contributors to volume 1 discuss recent work on the evolution of moral beliefs, attitudes, and emotions. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include a version of naturalism that avoids supposed fallacies, distinct neurocomputational systems for deontic reasoning, the evolutionary psychology of moral sentiments regarding incest, the sexual selection of moral virtues, the evolution of symbolic thought, and arguments both for and against innate morality. Taken together, the chapters demonstrate the value for both philosophy and psychology of collaborative efforts to understand the many complex aspects of morality.Contributors: William Casebeer, Leda Cosmides, Oliver Curry, Michael Dietrich, Catherine Driscoll, Susan Dwyer, Owen Flanagan, Jerry Fodor, Gilbert Harman, Richard Joyce, Debra Lieberman, Ron Mallon, John Mikhail, Geoffrey Miller, Jesse Prinz, Peter Railton, Michael Ruse, Hagop Sarkissian, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Chandra Sekhar Sripada, Valerie Tiberius, John Tooby, Peter Tse, Kathleen Wallace, Arthur Wolf, David Wong Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies at Dartmouth College.

The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness

Felipe De Brigard

Philosophers and neuroscientists address central issues in both fields, including morality, action, mental illness, consciousness, perception, and memory. Philosophers and neuroscientists grapple with the same profound questions involving consciousness, perception, behavior, and moral judgment, but only recently have the two disciplines begun to work together. This volume offers fourteen original chapters that address these issues, each written by a team that includes at least one philosopher and one neuroscientist who integrate disciplinary perspectives and reflect the latest research in both fields. Topics include morality, empathy, agency, the self, mental illness, neuroprediction, optogenetics, pain, vision, consciousness, memory, concepts, mind wandering, and the neural basis of psychological categories. The chapters first address basic issues about our social and moral lives: how we decide to act and ought to act toward each other, how we understand each other’s mental states and selves, and how we deal with pressing social problems regarding crime and mental or brain health. The following chapters consider basic issues about our mental lives: how we classify and recall what we experience, how we see and feel objects in the world, how we ponder plans and alternatives, and how our brains make us conscious and create specific mental states.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

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