Ralph Hertwig

Werner Güth

Lisa Bruttel

Simon Felgendreher

Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation

Brigitte Kalkofen

This book develops a general solution concept for strategic games which resolves strategic uncertainty completely. The concept is described by a mathematically formulated solution procedure and illustrated by applying it to many interesting examples. A long nontechnical introduction tries to survey and to discuss the more technical parts of the book. The book and especially the introduction provide firm and consistent guidance for scholars of game theory. There are many open problems which could inspire further research efforts.

Equilibrium Selection Based on Resistance Avoidance

Unique Solutions for Strategic Games

Wulf Albers

Peter Hammerstein

Benny Moldovanu

Eric van Damme

Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.

Werner Güth

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