Name: Hamas contained
ISBN: 9780804797412

Tareq Baconi

the rise and pacification of Palestinian resistance

Hamas contained

nhu ⋆𐙚₊˚⊹

It did so while signaling its readiness for a longer-term political settlement, with the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 lines, without relinquishing the core drivers of the Palestinian struggle: legitimating Zionism or conceding on the right of return. Whereas the Palestinian Authority had been ideologically paci-fied, Hamas's government was only practically compliant its finger remained on the trigger.

The dehumanization of Palestinians is so thoroughly pervasive and so unquestioningly echoed by Western leaders that any effort to challenge Israel's system of dominationis met with perplexed reactions and uniform condemnation. In this reading, Hamas acted irrationally, Palestinians in Gaza were disposable to the movement as veritable human shields, and the system in its whole was sustainable. These reactions cohere with a broader tendency toward Western hypocrisy and racism, which has normalized the occupation and daily killing of Palestinians, and reacted only when the violence is directed at Israeli Jews. It is a reading that removes all agency from Palestinian actors seeking to overturn a regime bent on their erasure. It is also one that fails to grapple with the violence and complex ethics of anticolonial resistance, painting all forms of mobilization by Palestinians peaceful or otherwise as unacceptable.

Hamas's charter offered no explicit indication of the nature of its theological and political structures, neither did it signal that Hamas was looking to break from the modern trappings of a nation-state model. The charter spoke of how such an Islamic polity would allow for Christians and Jews to live in peace and harmony under Muslim rule. Despite this assertion, the rest of the charter shed light on Hamas's understanding of Israel, Judaism, and Zionism at the time it was released. The text was replete with anti-Semitic references that built on age-old stereotypes about the Jewish people, including their alleged accumulations of immense wealth, their treacherous and devious nature, and their ability to influence global media. 

Rather than joining the local leadership that was coordinating with the PLO to sustain the uprising, Hamas openly competed against it. As leaflets appeared on the streets in the West Bank and Gaza organizing acts of civil disobedience, Hamas proposed alternative strike dates. The movement's intervention was powerful, leading the PLO to accuse it of undermining unity. Given that the intifada had sprung out of Gaza, where Sheikh Yassin had cultivated the brotherhood's institutional reach deep into the local population, Hamas was able to capitalize on a strong following. The leaflets it published were different in language and feel from those officially issued by the intifada's leadership. They introduced a religious element into an uprising that was not thought of by most Palestinians in particularly religious terms. Slogans from Hamas proliferated, its graffiti attacking Jews and Christians as well as secular nationalists. 

More important was security. A core aspect of Oslo's incremental- iem was that the Palestinian Authority would be held accountable for eecurity issues that Israel might face after the redeployment off its occupation forces. The Palestinian Authority's ability to safeguard Israel's security was framed as a litmus test for Palestinian readiness to self-govern and a prerequisite for further Israeli withdrawal. Security coordination mechanisms were put in place between the Palestinian Authority's security forces and the Israeli intelligence and army. These entailed open Communication channels aimed at crushing any activity within the occupied territories that was deemed a security threat to Israel, such as resistance operations. The Oslo Accords ultimately segmented the West Bank into distinct zones, only 18 percent of which could ostensibly be administered by the Palestinian Authority with the remaining territory falling under Israeli control. In practice, this meant that Israeli forces could reenter any area within the occupied territories, even those that fell under Palestinian jurisdiction.

Netanyahu's cabinet and the PLO paid lip service to peace talks even as it became evident that the five-year deadline for reaching a final settlement, in 1999, would be missed. Aided by Israel, the Palestinian Authority sustained its crackdown on Hamas, causing severe damage to the movement. Hamas was further weakened when the United States designated it a terrorist organization in 1997, thereby limiting its activities internation- ally, while Netanyahu's government also pursued the movement's regional presence. 

Hamas's statements indicated both that its military operations during the Second Intifada were limited to the goal of liberating the occupied territories, rather than to the destruction of Israel, and that the movement was ready to end violence in return for an end to the occupation. In this way, Hamas accepted the notion of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, much as the PLO had done before it, without conceding the goal of liberating historic Palestine by recognizing Israel. Hamas saw itself postponing the full liberation of Palestine to a future battle, the responsibility for which it placed with the wider Arab and Islamic worlds." Like the PLO before it, Hamas regionalized the upris-ing, addressing the "Arab and Islamic Fronts" in all its leaflets.? Placing al-Agsa at the heart of the intifada, Hamas highlighted the Islamic world's responsibility to safeguard Jerusalem as it called for solidarity protests and the cutting of diplomatic relations between Israel and Arab countries, as well as for financial, military, and diplomatic support. While both Hamas and the PLO limited their immediate goals to the liberation of the occupied territories, Hamas was clear that force was the only way liberation could be unconditional.

In a memo circulated after the report's release, Hamas elaborated that "this crisis is not between two neighboring warriors. ... In reality it is the aggression of an oppressive occupation on an unarmed population. .. The occupation itself is the highest form of terrorism, violence and aggression. " Hamas's publications condemned the implicit "equalization of power" that they inferred from demand- ng that both parties cease violence: that was akin to "comparing the victim to the executioner, the murderer to the murdered." Hamas insisted that to end violence, the occupation itself had to be dismantled. It’s own attacks were portrayed as self-defense against the inherently violent nature of the occupation. 

Israel's withdrawal plans entailed the relocation of eight thousand Israeli settlers from twenty-one settlements within Gaza and four settle- ments in the West Bank. A forty-eight-hour voluntary evacuation com- menced on August 16 to allow settlers to move out on their own accord. After this period ended, thousands of Israeli army soldiers were sent in to forcibly remove hundreds of families who refused to leave. The evacuations entailed long hours where settlers barricaded themselves and faced off with the army. After the settlers were relocated, the Israeli army destroyed all the settlements left behind, leaving synagogues intact. 

With the aim of breaking Fatah's unilateralism and deflecting worries about its Islamic nature, Hamas offered a civilizational renaissance project that was open to "all those who suffered under Zionist brutality to come in as partners in the liberation struggle." It extended its arms to Christians and reaffirmed its commitment to the role of women. In contrast to Hamas's aspirations for the domestic reconfiguration and structural reorientation of the struggle, Fatah remained committed to the notion of a strategic peace in line with past agreements, while affirming the right of resistance in self-defense, as stipulated by international law.

Hamas's 2006 electoral victory caused utter confusion within the ad- ministration of George W. Bush, given its focus on democracy promo- tion in Palestine, and in Iraq, as a test case for the region. The mnost immediate reaction was trepidation regarding the place of a designated terrorist organization in public office. As Eliot Abrams, a senior mem- ber of the Bush administration, had noted in anticipation of a Hamas victory, "Legally we had to treat Hamas as we treated al Qaeda." In high-level meetings within the White House shortly after Hamas's victory was confirmed, it was quickly decided that the optimal response was to adopt a strategy that could isolate Hamas and reassert Fatah's dominance.' The dual-pronged plan was to be implemented on several levels: military, financial, and diplomatic.

Fatah's leadership was working from the premise of continuity, on the basis that the PLO was an authoritative body, akin to a sovereign state, recognized through its adherence to past agreements. Hamas dismissed these "delusions." Citing the absence of sovereignty, re- Deated American and Israeli intervention, and the vacuous nature of past agreements given Israeli intransigence and its expanding settle- ment of the West Bank, Hamas questioned the basis of international recognition. It insisted that the Cairo Declaration had made clear the PLO's illegitimacy given that movements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad had been absent from decision-making when past agreements were signed.38 Before past agreements could be upheld, Hamas in- sisted that the PLO would have to be reformed so that all political parties could have a say in reconstituting its manifesto. The widely un- derstood but unspoken implication was Hamas's desire to reverse the trajectory that the PLO had taken and the concessions it had made under Fatah's tenure, given the failure of the diplomatic path in secur- ing Palestinian rights.9

The blockade was particularly harsh in Gaza, where Israel shuttered all access intoo from the strip for 60 percent of the time from the moment Hamas was to or elected. This was criticized as a form of collective punishment againet civilians to penalize them for their democratic choice. Worried abo. the prospects of an economic collapse, President Bush declared that the United States would begin bolstering supplies to the Palestinians through international agencies such as the United Nations and the IIS Agency for International Development. This served the dual purpose of averting a humanitarian crisis and competing with Hamas's social and charitable infrastructure. The Europeans also began exploring means of putting together a transaction system that could deliver aid while bypassing Hamas's government. Prime Minister Olmert cot- tinued to withhold the Palestinian Authority's revenue, stressing hs intention to boycott the government while maintaining relations wiül President Abbas. Olmert's aide, Dov Weisglass, explained that Isracl approach was "to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make the die of hunger.”

Through the regional tour, Hamas's leaders defended the government's stance. Addressing calls for more flexibility in dealing with the Quartet's condi- tions, Meshal stated, We have shown enough flexibility. We cannot say more than the official Arab and Palestinian position, which is to call for a Palestinian state on the land occupied in 1967. The problem is not with us. It is not with Hamas, as in the past it was also not with the official Palestinian and Arab positions. The problem has always been with Israel.

Hamas believed Abbas was being groomed to emerge victori. ous from a future confrontation, actively precipitated or otherwise I90 These suspicions were not unfounded. The United States was indeed actively implementing its "train and equip" program, providing arms and training for Fatah's security forces to prepare them for a clash with Hamas. 

Despite this opposition, Hamas and Fatah moved toward implementation. On March 17, they put forward the poliical agenda of the new cabinet, which called for "respecting" past agree- ments made by the PLO; the right of return based on UN Resolution 194; and the right of resistance as defined by international law, meaning that civilians would not be targeted in armed operations.

Fatah claimed Hamas was "shooting and weeping," blaming the movement for kidnapping and torturing its followers, shooting them in the legs, and setting up random checkpoints to terrorize people in Gaza." Hamas in turn pointed the finger at Fatah, stating it had carried out cold-blooded executions in front of the security forces The murder of two imams, pulled out of their mosques in early Jun. was seen by Hamas as a point of no return. "The executions. wll not pass unpunished. That is a vow we have taken, there is no turning back," According to General Dayton, the American advisor to the Palestinian security forces on the ground, Gaza had disintegrated into a plethora of armed groups that called themselves armies working ou side the authority of any one faction. Dayton accused Hamas of carrying out aggressive attacks against Gazans and Fatah's security forces, claiming these actions cost it popular support while insisting Fatah’s forces were holding firm. 

Like the PLO before it, Hamas's political vision, and with it the internationally sanctioned right of self-determination, right of return, and right to resist- -demands that form the core of Palestinian nationalism-had effectively been neutralized by foreign intervention. Instead of the United States (and members of the international community) engaging with the concessions Hamas had made or applying pressure on Israel for its own failure to meet the same demands that were being placed on Hamas, funds and arms poured into the territories to quash the prospect of any form of viable or unified Palestinian resistance to Israel's ongoing occupation. On the eve of Hamas's takeover of Gaza, a leaked report noted that Abbas had asked for Israeli intervention to assist Fatah's forces in combating Hamas's offensive. A senior member of Israel's security establishment was quoted as being "happy at the prospect of Hamas taking over the Gaza Strip, as that would then allow Israel to declare the coastal enclave a "hostile territory." This development, the culmination of policies aimed at severing Gaza from the territories that had officially begun with Sharon's disengagement two years prior, was now imminent.

Despite this focus on internal sustenance, household income dropped sharply and dependence on food aid expanded. 66 The desper- ate situation led to and was ultimately mitigated by a rapid shift to- ward a tunnel-based economy.7 Tunnels between the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt and the Gaza Strip, passing underneath the Rafah border. had historically been used for smuggling contraband and resistance weapons, particularly during the Second Intifada. After Israel's disen- gagement from Gaza and as policies aimed at isolating Hamas gath- ered force, the economic value of the tunnels increased even before the movement's electoral victory. With the blockade and the absence of any official trade channels, tunnels became Gaza's economic lifeline. From twenty tunnels in mid-2007, the number began expanding soon after Hamas's takeover as all basic supplies and goods, as well as weapons, were transported into the Gaza Strip via tunnels. As Hamas oversaw a ncerted drive to expand the tunnel infrastructure in Egypt, it began creatinga shadow subterranean economy that benefited Hamas's ruling class rather than the traditional mercantile sector within Gaza 68

The movement reiterated that the blockade constituted an act of aggression in its own right, thereby underscoring the need for armed struggle, rather than diplomacy, to bring it to an end. Sharon's disengagement from Gaza had heightened Hamas's conviction in the capacity of violence to achieve concessions. 

Hamas contained the rise and pacification of Palestinian resistance

Reviews

Highlights