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Strategic Studies Strategic Studies Institute

Gary Schmitt

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Ariel Cohen

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Stephen J. Blank

Politics and Economics in Putin's Russia

Key points from this analysis include: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an enduring association which was originally brought together by the short-term border security interests of its first five members. Russia believes it plays a leading role in the SCO; in fact, however, the organization is and always has been driven by China, and Moscow's role is vital but secondary. The other member states, former Central Asian Soviet republics with no history of modern statehood or governance, are not equal partners-but their geostrategic location and, in some cases, natural resources make them potentially valuable allies for the United States and other major powers. The SCO is unlikely to enlarge further. Since its inception, the SCO has received several applications for membership. However, any enlargement of the organization could be fraught with difficulties, mainly because of conflicts of interest between China and Russia and the fear by member states that some new candidates are potential international liabilities and may create further conflict within the organization.

Strategic Implications of the Evolving Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Terrorists are known to use the Internet for communications, planning, recruitment, propaganda, and reconnaissance. They have shown interest in carrying out cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructures, although no such serious attacks are known publicly to have occurred. The discovery of the Stuxnet malware in July 2010, and its analysis over the next several months, was widely believed to have been a landmark event in cybersecurity, because it showed that cyberattacks against industrial control systems, hypothesized for a long time, are actually possible. After Stuxnet, there were public concerns that terrorists might be encouraged to acquire capabilities for similar cyberattacks. This book examines cyberterrorism before and after Stuxnet by addressing questions of: 1.Motive-Are terrorists interested in launching cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructures? 2. Means-Are terrorists building capabilities and skills for cyberattacks? 3.Opportunity-How vulnerable are U.S. critical infrastructures? It is noted that no serious cyberterrorism attacks have occurred after Stuxnet. This can be explained from a cost-benefit perspective that has not changed since Stuxnet. It can be argued that U.S. policies can really address vulnerabilities only by strengthening defenses of critical infrastructures.

Cyberterrorism After Stuxnet

Strategic Studies Strategic Studies Institute

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