Nicola Gennaioli

Andrei Shleifer

How investor expectations move markets and the economy The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 caught markets and regulators by surprise. Although the government rushed to rescue other financial institutions from a similar fate after Lehman, it could not prevent the deepest recession in postwar history. A Crisis of Beliefs makes us rethink the financial crisis and the nature of economic risk. In this authoritative and comprehensive book, two of today’s most insightful economists reveal how our beliefs shape financial markets, lead to expansions of credit and leverage, and expose the economy to major risks. Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer carefully walk readers through the unraveling of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing meltdown of the US financial system, and then present new evidence to illustrate the destabilizing role played by the beliefs of home buyers, investors, and regulators. Using the latest research in psychology and behavioral economics, they present a new theory of belief formation that explains why the financial crisis came as such a shock to so many people—and how financial and economic instability persist. A must-read for anyone seeking insights into financial markets, A Crisis of Beliefs shows how even the smartest market participants and regulators did not fully appreciate the extent of economic risk, and offers a new framework for understanding today’s unpredictable financial waters.

Investor Psychology and Financial Fragility

A Crisis of Beliefs

The efficient markets hypothesis has been the central proposition in finance for nearly thirty years. It states that securities prices in financial markets must equal fundamental values, either because all investors are rational or because arbitrage eliminates pricing anomalies.This book describes an alternative approach to the study of financial markets: behavioral finance. This approach starts with an observation that the assumptions of investor rationality and perfect arbitrage are overwhelmingly contradicted by both psychological and institutional evidence. In actual financial markets, less than fully rational investors trade against arbitrageurs whose resources are limited by risk aversion, short horizons, and agency problems. The book presents and empiricallyevaluates models of such inefficient markets.Behavioral finance models both explain the available financial data better than does the efficient markets hypothesis and generate new empirical predictions. These models can account for such anomalies as the superior performance of value stocks, the closed end fund puzzle, the high returns on stocks included in market indices, the persistence of stock price bubbles, and even the collapse of several well-known hedge funds in 1998. By summarizing and expanding the research in behavioral finance,the book builds a new theoretical and empirical foundation for the economic analysis of real-world markets.

An Introduction to Behavioral Finance

Inefficient Markets:An Introduction to Behavioral Finance

Edward L. Glaeser

José Alexandre Scheinkman

Abstract: We examine the relationship between urban characteristics in 1960 and urban growth (income and population) between 1960 and 1990. Our major findings are that income and population growth move together and both types of growth are (1) positively related to initial schooling, (2) negatively related to initial unemployment and (3) negatively related to the share of employment initially in manufacturing. These results are qualitatively unchanged if we examine cities (a smaller political unit) or SMSAs (a larger 'economic' unit). We also find that racial composition and segregation are basically uncorrelated with urban growth across all cities, but that in communities with large nonwhite communities segregation is positively correlated with white population growth. Government expenditures (except for sanitation) are uncorrelated with urban growth. Government debt is positively correlated with later growth.

Economic Growth in a Cross-section of Cities

This book offers a firsthand glimpse into the intellectual challenges that Russia's turbulent transition generated. It deals with many of the most important reforms, from Gorbachev's half-hearted "perestroika," to the mass privatization program, to the efforts to build legal and regulatory institutions of a market economy.

Russia After Communism

A Normal Country

A noted economist argues that the ubiquity of regulation can be explained by its greater efficiency when compared to litigation. Government regulation is ubiquitous today in rich and middle-income countries—present in areas that range from workplace conditions to food processing to school curricula—although standard economic theories predict that it should be rather uncommon. In this book, Andrei Shleifer argues that the ubiquity of regulation can be explained not so much by the failure of markets as by the failure of courts to solve contract and tort disputes cheaply, predictably, and impartially. When courts are expensive, unpredictable, and biased, the public will seek alternatives to dispute resolution. The form this alternative has taken throughout the world is regulation. The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators gathers Shleifer's influential writings on regulation and adds to them a substantial introductory essay in which Shleifer critiques the standard theories of economic regulation and proposes “the Enforcement Theory of Regulation,” which sees regulation as the more efficient strategy for social control of business. Subsequent chapters present the theoretical and empirical case against the efficiency of courts, make the historical and theoretical case for the comparative efficiency of regulation, and offer two empirical studies suggesting circumstances in which regulation might emerge as an efficient solution to social problems. Shleifer does not offer an unconditional endorsement of regulation and its expansion but rather argues that it is better than its alternatives, particularly litigation. Contributors Nicola Gennaioli, Anthony Niblett, Richard A. Posner, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Edward L. Glaeser, Simon Johnson, Casey B. Mulligan

The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators

National Bureau of Economic Research

Matthew Rognlie

Alp Simsek

We present a model of investment hangover motivated by the Great Recession. In our model, overbuilding of residential capital requires a reallocation of productive resources to nonresidential sectors, which is facilitated by a reduction in the real interest rate. If the fall in the interest rate is limited by the zero lower bound and nominal rigidities, then the economy enters a liquidity trap with limited reallocation and low output. The drop in output reduces nonresidential investment through a mechanism similar to the acceleration principle of investment. The burst in nonresidential investment is followed by an even greater boom due to low interest rates during the liquidity trap. The boom in nonresidential investment induces a partial and asymmetric recovery in which the residential sector is left behind, consistent with the broad trends of the Great Recession.

Investment Hangover and the Great Recession

Maxim Boycko

Robert Vishny

Privatizing Russia offers an inside look at one of the most remarkable reforms in recent history. Having started on the back burner of Russian politics in the fall of 1991, mass privatization was completed on July 1, 1994, with two thirds of the Russian industry privately owned, a rapidly rising stock market, and 40 million Russians owning company shares. The authors, all key participants in the reform effort, describe the events and the ideas driving privatization. They argue that successful reformers must recognize privatization as a process of depoliticizing firms in the face of massive opposition: making the firm responsive to market rather than political influences. The authors first review the economic theory of property rights, identifying the political influence on firms as the fundamental failure of property rights under socialism. They detail the process of coalition building and compromise that ultmately shaped privatization. The main elements of the Russian program -- corporatization, voucher use, and voucher auctions -- are described, as is the responsiveness of privatized firms to outside investors. Finally, the market values of privatized assets are assessed for indications of how much progress the country has made toward reforming its economy. In many respects, privatization has been a great success. Market concepts of property ownership and corporate management are shaking up Russian firms at a breathtaking pace, creating powerful economic and political stimuli for continuation of market reforms. At the same time, the authors caution, the political landscape remains treacherous as old-line politicians reluctantly cede their property rights and authority over firms.

Andrei Shleifer

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