Henry D. Sokolski

This volume consists of research that the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) commissioned and vetted throughout 2006. For at least half of the chapters, authors presented versions of their work as testimony before Congressional oversight committees. No matter what one's point of view, these chapters deserve close attention since all are focused on what is needed to assure U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation succeeds. The volume offers U.S. and Indian policy and law makers a detailed checklist of things to watch, avoid, and try to achieve.

Gauging U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation

Although the United States efforts to prevent the spread of strategic weapons have varied significantly since 1945, they all presumed to be avoiding one or another type of strategic war. To the extent their military scenarios were sound, so too were the nonproliferation remedies these initiatives promoted. But, as Sokolski demonstrates, the obverse was also true--when these intiatives' military hopes and fears were mistaken, their nonproliferation recommendations also missed their mark. What is the best hope for breaking out of this box and securing a higher rate of nonproliferation success? The United States must base nonproliferation policies less on insights concerning strategic military trends and more on the progressive economic and political trends that have increased the number of relatively peaceful, prosperous, liberal democracies. For the proliferating nations that are exceptions to this trend, the U.S. and its allies need to devise ways of competing that will encourage these governments to expend more energies shoring up their weaknesses and eventually giving way to less militant regimes. A major resource for students and military professionals interested in arms control and international relations.

America's Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation

Best of Intentions

With most of the world's advanced economies now stuck in recession; Western support for defense cuts and nuclear disarmament increasing; and a major emerging Asian power at odds with its neighbors and the United States; it is tempting to think our times are about to rhyme with a decade of similar woes—the disorderly 1930s.Might we again be drifting toward some new form of mortal national combat? Or, will our future more likely ape the near-half-century that defined the Cold War—a period in which tensions between competing states ebbed and flowed but peace mostly prevailed by dint of nuclear mutual fear and loathing?The short answer is, nobody knows. This much, however, is clear: The strategic military competitions of the next 2 decades will be unlike any the world has yet seen. Assuming U.S., Chinese, Russian, Israeli, Indian, French, British, and Pakistani strategic forces continue to be modernized and America and Russia continue to reduce their strategic nuclear deployments, the next arms race will be run by a much larger number of contestants—with highly destructive strategic capabilities far more closely matched and capable of being quickly enlarged than in any other previous period in history.

The Next Arms Race

Weighing Its Costs and Risks

Nuclear Power's Global Expansion

Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

As currently interpreted, it is difficult to see why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) warrants much support as a nonproliferation convention. Most foreign ministries, including that of Iran and the United States, insist that Article IV of the NPT recognizes the "inalienable right" of all states to develop "peaceful nuclear energy." This includes money-losing activities, such as nuclear fuel reprocessing, which can bring countries to the very brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. If the NPT is intended to ensure that states share peaceful "benefits" of nuclear energy and to prevent the spread of nuclear bomb making technologies, it is difficult to see how it can accomplish either if the interpretation identified above is correct. Some argue, however, that the NPT clearly proscribes proliferation by requiring international nuclear safeguards against military diversions of fissile material. Unfortunately, these procedures, which are required of all non-nuclear weapons state members of the NPT under Article III, are rickety at best. Each chapter of this book is dedicated to clarifying the NPT's key ambiguities, and the chapters are roughly structured to trace the NPT's text, article by article. The analysis set forth here was mostly written or commissioned by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Much more, of course, could have been included in this book. But rather than seeking to be comprehensive, the aim throughout is to provide a guide for both policymakers and security analysts. This guide should assist in navigating the most important debates over how best to read and implement the NPT and, in the process, spotlighting alternative views of the NPT that are sound and supportable. Related products: Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2016 can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/044-000-02684-8 The Warsaw Pact, Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance: Soviet-East European Military Relations in Historical Perspective: Sources and Reassessments can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00306-2 Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01098-6

Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

With the change of administrations in Washington, current U.S. policy toward North Korea will naturally undergo review and scrutiny. The essays in this volume offer an option to the current engagement approach. The authors suggest an alternative strategy for promoting peace and security in the Korean peninsula different from the ones contemplated or implemented by Washington in recent years.

Planning for a Peaceful Korea

Missile defense and unmanned air vehicle related technologies, are proliferating for a variety of perfectly defensive and peaceful civilian applications. This same know-how can be used to defeat U.S. and allied air and missile defenses in new ways that are far more stressful than the existing set of ballistic missile threats. Unfortunately, the Missile Technology Control Regime is not yet optimized to cope with these challenges. Nuclear technologies have become much more difficult to control since new centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities and relatively small fuel reprocessing plants can now be built and hidden much more readily than nuclear fuel-making plants that were operating when the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the bulk of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections procedures were first devised 30 or more years ago. This volume is designed to highlight what might happen if these emerging threats go unattended and how best to mitigate them.

Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats

Bruno Tertrais

At the height of the Cultural Revolution a Chinese long-range nuclear missile is fired within the country, and the nuclear warhead it is carrying detonates. A French nuclear device is exploded in Algeria during a coup there. The Soviet empire has collapsed, and shots are fired at a Russian crowd intent on rushing a nuclear weapons-laden plane straining to remove a stash of nuclear weapons to a safer locale. Pakistani civilian governments are routinely pushed aside by a powerful, nuclear-armed military that observers worry might yet itself fall prey to a faction willing to seize a portion of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. This volume reveals previously unknown details on each case and teases out what is to be learned. This book is ideal not only for policymakers and analysts, but for historians and teachers as well.

What Does History Teach?

Nuclear Weapons Security Crises

Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice is the first critical history of the intellectual roots and actual application of the strategic doctrine of nuclear mutual assured destruction or MAD. Written by the world's leading French, British, and American military policy planners and analysts, this volume examines how MAD and its emphasis on the military targeting of population centers influenced the operational plans of the major nuclear powers and states, such as Pakistan, India, and Israel. Given America's efforts to move away from MAD and the continued reliance on MAD thinking by smaller nations to help justify further nuclear proliferation, Getting MAD is a timely must read for anyone eager to understand our nuclear past and future.

nuclear mutual assured destruction, its origins and practice

Getting MAD

If possible, it would be useful to enhance the International Atomic Energy Agency?s ability to detect and prevent nuclear diversions. This would not only reduce the current risk of nuclear proliferation, it would make the further expansion of nuclear power much less risky.

Henry D. Sokolski

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