Tom Ginsburg

Rosalind Dixon

Adem Abebe

This timely book is a crucial resource on the rich diversity of African constitutional law, making a significant contribution to the increasingly important field of comparative constitutional law from a historically understudied region. Offering an examination of substantive topics from multiple jurisdictions, it emphasises issues of local importance while also providing varied perspectives on common challenges across the continent.

Comparative Constitutional Law in Africa

Randall Peerenboom

In 1960, there were 101 middle-income countries. By 2008, only thirteen of these had become high-income countries. Why do so many middle-income countries fail to develop after a promising start, becoming mired in the so-called middle-income trap? This interdisciplinary volume addresses the special challenges that middle-income countries confront from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. It is the first volume that addresses law and development issues in middle-income countries from the perspective of political, administrative and legal institutions and policies. The goal is to provide international development agencies and domestic policy makers with feasible recommendations to address the wide range of technically, politically and socially complex issues that middle-income countries face.

Avoiding the Middle-Income Trap

Law and Development of Middle-Income Countries

Aziz Z. Huq

Asks how the 'parchment' promises of a written constitution are translated into political practice, working through the many problems of constitutional implementation after adoption.

Implementing New Constitutions

From Parchment to Practice

Sujit Choudhry

Constitution making is a topic of increasing scholarly and practical interest. Focusing on a set of important case studies, yet also featuring classic articles on the subject, this volume is a critical assembly of theoretical literature. Ensuring wide geographic and historical coverage, and including an original introduction by the editors, this collection provides an essential overview of the myriad of circumstances in which constitutions can be made.

Constitution Making

Nuno Garoupa

Judges are society’s elders and experts, our masters and mediators. We depend on them to dispense justice with integrity, deliberation, and efficiency. Yet judges, as Alexander Hamilton famously noted, lack the power of the purse or the sword. They must rely almost entirely on their reputations to secure compliance with their decisions, obtain resources, and maintain their political influence. In Judicial Reputation, Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg explain how reputation is not only an essential quality of the judiciary as a whole, but also of individual judges. Perceptions of judicial systems around the world range from widespread admiration to utter contempt, and as judges participate within these institutions some earn respect, while others are scorned. Judicial Reputation explores how judges respond to the reputational incentives provided by the different audiences they interact with—lawyers, politicians, the media, and the public itself—and how institutional structures mediate these interactions. The judicial structure is best understood not through the lens of legal culture or tradition, but through the economics of information and reputation. Transcending those conventional lenses, Garoupa and Ginsburg employ their long-standing research on the latter to examine the fascinating effects that governmental interactions, multicourt systems, extrajudicial work, and the international rule-of-law movement have had on the reputations of judges in this era.

A Comparative Theory

Judicial Reputation

Harry N. Scheiber

Japan's legal system has entered its second decade since the adoption of the Justice System Reform Council Report in 2001, and its third decade of what have been called the Heisei reforms, after the current Imperial reign. This period has seen what must be characterized as steady restructuring of legal institutions, with the intention of producing a more responsive legal system. The most dramatic changes-those to legal education, to civil procedure, and to the criminal trial process with the introduction of the jury system-have now had several years to operate. Yet it is becoming clear that in numerous other areas of law there have been substantive changes, and that these may have significant consequences for Japanese society in the decades ahead. This volume seeks to provide a snapshot of many of these areas of legal change, and to explore how innovations are operating in practice.

An Era of Transition

The Japanese Legal System

In "Judicial Reputation: A Comparative Theory, "Tom Ginsburg and Nuno Garoupa mean to explain how judges respond to the reputational incentives provided by the different audiences they interact with--lawyers and law professors; politicians; the media; and the public itself--as well as how legal systems design their judicial institutions to calibrate the locally appropriate balance among audiences. Making use by turns of careful empirical work and penetrating conceptual insights, Ginsburg and Garoupa argue that any given judicial structure is best understood not through the lens of legal culture, origin, or tradition, but through the economics of information and reputation.

James Melton

Zachary Elkins

Constitutions are supposed to provide an enduring structure for politics. Yet only half live more than nineteen years. Why is it that some constitutions endure while others do not? In The Endurance of National Constitutions, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton examine the causes of constitutional endurance from an institutional perspective. Supported by an original set of cross-national historical data, theirs is the first comprehensive study of constitutional mortality. They show that whereas constitutions are imperiled by social and political crises, certain aspects of a constitution's design can lower the risk of death substantially. Thus, to the extent that endurance is desirable - a question that the authors also subject to scrutiny - the decisions of founders take on added importance.

The Endurance of National Constitutions

Tamir Moustafa

Scholars have generally assumed that courts in authoritarian states are pawns of their regimes, upholding the interests of governing elites and frustrating the efforts of their opponents. As a result, nearly all studies in comparative judicial politics have focused on democratic and democratizing countries. This volume brings together leading scholars in comparative judicial politics to consider the causes and consequences of judicial empowerment in authoritarian states. It demonstrates the wide range of governance tasks that courts perform, as well as the way in which courts can serve as critical sites of contention both among the ruling elite and between regimes and their citizens. Drawing on empirical and theoretical insights from every major region of the world, this volume advances our understanding of judicial politics in authoritarian regimes.

The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes

Rule By Law

Democracies are in danger. Around the world, a rising wave of populist leaders threatens to erode the core structures of democratic self rule. In the United States, the election of Donald Trump marked a decisive turning point for many. What kind of president calls the news media the "enemy of the American people," or sees a moral equivalence between violent neo-Nazi protesters in paramilitary formation and residents of a college town defending the racial and ethnic diversity of their homes? Yet, whatever our concerns about the current president, we can be assured that the Constitution offers safeguards to protect against lasting damage--or can we? How to Save a Constitutional Democracy mounts an urgent argument that we can no longer afford to be complacent. Drawing on a rich array of other countries' experiences with democratic backsliding, Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq show how constitutional rules can either hinder or hasten the decline of democratic institutions. The checks and balances of the federal government, a robust civil society and media, and individual rights--such as those enshrined in the First Amendment--do not necessarily succeed as bulwarks against democratic decline. Rather, Ginsburg and Huq contend, the sobering reality for the United States is that, to a much greater extent than is commonly realized, the Constitution's design makes democratic erosion more, not less, likely. Its structural rigidity has had the unforeseen consequence of empowering the Supreme Court to fill in some details--often with doctrines that ultimately facilitate rather than inhibit the infringement of rights. Even the bright spots in the Constitution--the First Amendment, for example--may have perverse consequences in the hands of a deft communicator, who can degrade the public sphere by wielding hateful language that would be banned in many other democracies. But we--and the rest of the world--can do better. The authors conclude by laying out practical steps for how laws and constitutional design can play a more positive role in managing the risk of democratic decline.

How to Save a Constitutional Democracy

Alberto Simpser

This volume explores the form and function of constitutions in countries without the fully articulated institutions of limited government.

Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes

New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop in the early stages of democratic liberalization, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in Asia: Taiwan, Korea, and Mongolia. In a region that has traditionally viewed law as a tool of authoritarian rulers, constitutional courts in these three societies are becoming a real constraint on government. In contrast with conventional culturalist accounts, this book argues that the design and functioning of constitutional review are largely a function of politics and interests. Judicial review - the power of judges to rule an act of a legislature or national leader unconstitutional - is a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing insurance to prospective electoral losers, judicial review can facilitate democracy.

Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases

Judicial Review in New Democracies

Georg Vanberg

Mark D. Rosen

Financial crises put pressure on constitutional orders, inviting exceptional responses that vary in effectiveness, and have an impact long afterwards.

Constitutions in Times of Financial Crisis

This landmark volume of specially commissioned, original contributions by top international scholars organizes the issues and controversies of the rich and rapidly maturing field of comparative constitutional law. Divided into sections on constitutional design and redesign, identity, structure, individual rights and state duties, courts and constitutional interpretation, this comprehensive volume covers over 100 countries as well as a range of approaches to the boundaries of constitutional law. While some chapters reference the text of legal instruments expressly labeled constitutional, others focus on the idea of entrenchment or take a more functional approach. Challenging the current boundaries of the field, the contributors offer diverse perspectives - cultural, historical and institutional - as well as suggestions for future research. A unique and enlightening volume, Comparative Constitutional Law is an essential resource for students and scholars of the subject.

Comparative Constitutional Law

Based on original historical data, this book shows that key changes in design can extend constitutional life.

Tom Ginsburg

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