Representations Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science

A collection of eleven essays dealing with methodological and empirical issues incognitive science and in the philosophy of mind, Representations convincingly connects philosophicalspeculation to concrete empirical research.One of the outstanding methodological issues dealt withis the status of functionalism considered as an alternative to behavioristic and physicalisticaccounts. of mental states and properties. The other issue is the status of reductionism consideredas an account of the relation between the psychological and physical sciences. The first chapterspresent the main lines of argument which have made functionalism the currently favored philosophicalapproach to ontology of the mental.The outlines of a psychology of propositional attitudes whichemerges from consideration of current developments in cognitive science are contained in theremaining essays.Not all of these essays are re-presentations. The new introductory essay seeks topresent an overview and gives some detailed proposals about the contribution that functionalismmakes to the solutions of problems about intentionality. The concluding essay, also not previouslypublished, is a sustained examination of the relation between theories about the structure ofconcepts and theories about how they are learned. Finally, the essay "Three cheers for propositionalattitudes", a critical examination of some of D. C. Dennett's ideas, has been completely rewrittenfor this volume. A Bradford Book.