I’ve been interested in reading about social class in general—because it does feel like earlier works, e.g. Bourdieu in the 1960s), don’t perfectly fit into contemporary ideas of class anymore—and about class in the UK especially. (When I moved to London someone gave me a rundown of grocery stores in order of poshness: Waitrose, M&S, Sainsbury’s, Tesco, Aldi/Lidl. And that’s been entirety of my understanding of class in Britain, until this book.) Generally, it’s very accessible and has a good mix of quantitative/qualitative discussion. Respectful of and relies heavily on Bourdieu's Distinction and Piketty’s Capital. Some key takeaways: — Bourdieu’s idea of cultural capital was that access to ‘legitimate culture’ (art, opera, classic literature) is a form of capital that people can use to advantage themselves and enforce distinctions between themselves and others. Bourdieu, of course, was writing at a time when cinema and photography were not quite art. This book suggests that legitimate culture is a useful marker for elite status and greater cultural capital for older generations—but for newer generations, it’s not just about the classics but about engaging with an eclectic mix of emerging culture (so: being able to make references to Proust, listen to the Good Techno and not the Generic Mainstream Techno, etc). This doesn’t mean that cultural capital in the twenty-first century is more inclusive; the goalposts have moved, but the way cultural access and awareness is used to enforce good and bad taste (and consequently higher or lower class) still holds. — The distinction between ‘middle class’ and ‘working class’ isn’t as distinct or useful today. Instead, Savage and his coauthors suggest that the very wealthy, elite class and the economically marginalised precariat are extremely distinct classes, and the middle class is a muddled, indistinct category. Especially interesting (and something I’ll have to think about more!) is their argument that, when it comes to UK politics, a political strategy based on reviving working-class identity and solidarity is no longer tenable. — They prefer the term ‘precariat’ instead of ‘underclass’, arguing that ‘precariat’ is less stigmatising and accurately depicts how economic precarity and cultural marginalisation is due to broader labour market and social dynamics, and not something inherent to whether people in the precariat ‘deserve’ to be poor. (Surely no one deserves to experience housing or food insecurity…) — Savage argues that focusing too much on the 1% ignores the ordinary inequalities that accumulate to the top, say, 6%. I found this argument quite compelling because yes, obviously Jeff Bezos is egregiously wealthy, but inequality exists in less showy ways (through the advantages homeowners vs renters have, through the accumulation of social and cultural capital Oxbridge graduates—or let’s say Ivy League graduates in the US case—have) that are still deleterious to society. — The ways people identify with (or resist identification with!) class distinction varies based on…class, obviously, as well as race and gender. There’s an interesting bit about how women in the precariat (unstable employment, generally looked down on) more readily identify as being part of the precariat than men, who are more eager to identify as anything-but-the-bottom. — Not a new revelation, but having the data helps: the economic and cultural dominance of London compared to the rest of the UK is unreal. Similarly, the economic opportunities and trajectories of Oxbridge + key London institutions is wildly different than…basically everywhere else in the UK.