Nuclear Winter Implications for U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Strategy

In November 1983 Dr. Carl Sagan and his colleagues reported to press on the results of their study of the atmospheric consequences of nuclear war. The TTAPS study found that for a wide range of possible U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchanges, including relatively small ones, the fires from nuclear detonations would inject into the stratosphere quantities of dust and soot that would obscure sunlight for months. Under the cloud, which would spread over most of the Northern Hemisphere, temperatures might drop scores of degrees, well below the freezing point of water; thus, 'nuclear winter.' The TTAPS team's findings suggested that the consequences of a nuclear war might be even more gruesome than previously supposed, and the long-term climatic and biological results might be nearly as severe for a war of 100 megatons as for 5,000. From the point of view of informing policymakers and the public concerning the consequences of wars involving nuclear weapons, the politicization of the nuclear winter issue is unfortunate. We can hope that in the next few years the criticism and defense of the initial TTAPS work will give rise to significant additional analyses, to illuminate the question. Realistically, further study will probably include both confirmations and contradictions of the original findings, without necessarily 'resolving' the issue. Sadly, the surrounding political atmosphere may obstruct sober consideration of the policy implications of the possibility of nuclear winter.