Beijing and the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965-68 New Evidence from Chinese Sources

The Johnson administration's escalation of the war in Vietnam in 1965 triggered strong domestic criticism. Responding to public pressure, President Johnson made a number of peace overtures to North Vietnam. The escalating conflict in Indochina also drew serious attention around the world. Efforts were made by various countries to promote a peaceful solution to the Indochina conflict. Thus, the war in Vietnam was intertwined with a series of peac initiatives made not only by Washington but also by Moscow, London, Paris, and a number of British commonwealth capitals. How did leaders in Beijing perceive these initiatives? Why were they so consistent and firm in opposing them? What were the repercussions of China's policy in the world? This paper uses newly released Chinese sources to answer these questions. It argues that China's opposition to Vietnam peace talks was linked to Mao's complex calculations of establishing Beijing's leadership position within the Third World national liberation movement, limiting Soviet influence in Indochina, and mobilizing domestic support for his social and political programs.