History and Analysis of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (Mrap) Procurement to Fight the Ied Threat in the Iraq War, Applicability of the Law of Requisite Variety in Major Military System Acquisition

In 2005, the U.S. military found itself inadequately prepared with doctrine and materiel to wage counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. As the insurgency adapted to American tactics, the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) became a target of the insurgency because of its lack of armor, which led to significant casualties caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The U.S. response to the IED threat to HMMWVs was to procure the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle, a costly endeavor. The MRAP increased Soldier and Marine survival rates during IED attacks, but other aspects of the vehicle contradicted counterinsurgency strategy. Because of its survivability, leaders expected tactical commanders to use the MRAP, which reduced tactical commanders' variety of options to engage the enemy. This research explores the value of variety in major military systems by applying concepts from the Law of Requisite Variety and uses the MRAP as an example of a materiel solution throughout. Increasing system variety conflicts with current acquisition practices, which prefer commonality. This research finds that warfighter capabilities increase with variety, but variety is contra to achieving commonality and cost savings. To achieve a balance between commonality and variety, the authors suggest organizational and system hardware alternatives. I. INTRODUCTION * A. SUMMARY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN IRAQ FOLLOWING MAJOR COMBAT ACTIONS * B. RELEVANT HISTORY OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE USE IN IRAQ * C. AN ENEMY FORESEEN * D. RELEVANCE OF THE RESEARCH * II. COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE * A. WHAT IS AN INSURGENCY? * 1. A Long Conflict * 2. Against a Government * 3. Normally Fought by Unequal Enemies * 4. Without Restriction * 5. To Achieve Political Objectives * B. WHAT IS A COUNTERINSURGENCY? * 1. Legitimizing the Incumbent Government * 2. Through Unified and Committed Response * 3. Against an Insurgency * 4. Using the Full Spectrum of Military Power * C. MATERIEL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY * D. SUMMARY * III. DOD' S ACQUISITION FRAMEWORK VS. THE MRAP * A. HOW DOES THE DOD GENERATE REQUIREMENTS? * 1. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System * 2. Defense Acquisition System * 3. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) * B. WHY THE MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLE? * 1. The Unforeseen: Why Was the DOD Slow to Procure the MRAP? * 2. Why Did the DOD Finally Procure the MRAP? * C. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT * 1. Uniqueness of the Purchase * 2. Speed of MRAP Testing, Fielding, and Deployment * D. SUMMARY * IV. THE LAW OF REQUISITE VARIETY * A. THE FIELD OF CYBERNETICS * B. QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF REQUISITE VARIETY * 1. Common Applications of Law of Requisite Variety * 2. Incremental Application of Law of Requisite Variety * 3. The Importance of Variety in LORV * 4. Clarifications for Military Applications of LORV * C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR VARIETY IN THE CURRENT ACQUISITION SYSTEM * D. SUMMARY OF LAW OF REQUISITE VARIETY * V. INTERSECTION OF COMPETING PRIORITIES * A. WHY IS THE INTERSECTION CRITICAL? * B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VARIETY IN COMBAT * C. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF COMMONALITY * D. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF VARIETY * E. ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES * F. THE DEMAND FOR VARIETY IN THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM * G. RECOMMENDATIONS * 1. Create a Variety Advocate Function * 2. Increase Focus on Subsystem Commonality * H. CHAPTER SUMMARY * VI. CONCLUSION * A. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS * B. AREAS FOR CONTINUED RESEARCH