The U.S. Army's Evolving Role in Security Force Assistance (Sfa) Linking Ends and Means - Critical Analysis of Policies and Doctrine Authorizing Sfa Missions, Why Army Is Establishing Six Brigades

This study examines one central issue: How has the U.S. Army improved security force assistance (SFA) design with the implementation of the SFA Brigade (SFAB)? Secondarily, it investigates whether failures at the strategic policy level inhibited the accomplishment of enduring security objectives related to the establishment of the new unit. To address this question, the study will briefly describe concepts of U.S. strategic thought that underlie the policy consensus to conduct SFA activities in fragile regions. This study will evaluate the innovation and adaption of the Army's SFA organizations/doctrine, so as to determine how well it fits into a greater U.S. strategy. It will also critically analyze SFA policy and procedures in order to identify areas for improvement. Two hypotheses are proposed with a research-based evidence chain suggesting both are confirmed. First, this study suggests SFABs are being established to increase the warfighting readiness of the Army, reduce SFA burdens on U.S. special forces, and secure resources to meet enduring security requirements. Second, ad-hoc approaches to SFA by the U.S. Army up to this point were in fact a by-product of disjointed policy, large resource disparities at the departmental level, and an overreliance on military solutions. As such, this study concludes with policy recommendations to rebalance and integrate various security programs that focus on institutional capacity in order to secure gains made by SFA.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.I. Introduction * A. Major Research Question * B. Significance of the Research Question * C. Literature Review * D. Potential Explanations and Hypotheses * E. Research Design * F. Study Overview and Chapter Outline * II. The Strategic Context of Security Force Assistance * A. Introduction * B. How SFA Fits into U.S. Grand Strategy * C. How SFA Fits into U.S. Strategic Guidance * D. SFA and Fragile States * E. Conclusion * III. Security Force Assistance Policy and Plans * A. Introduction * B. Assumptions Made During SFA Planning * C. Constraints Overlooked During SFA Planning * D. Implications of Assumptions and Constraints * E. Critical Analysis of Current SFA Policy * F. Conclusion * IV. The U.S. Army's Role In Security Force Assistance * A. Introduction * B. Innovation and Adaption - The U.S. Army's SFA Growing Pains * C. Innovation and Adaption of SFA Doctrine * D. Innovation and Adaption of SFA Organizations * E. Balancing Operational Requirements to Increase Readiness and Meet Mission * F. Conclusion * V. Conclusion * A. Findings * B. RecommendationsThe U.S. Army has been the primary Military Department (MILDEP) utilized to build foreign militaries and defense institutions in order to establish long term stability, prevent attacks on the homeland, and promote peace in regions thought to be critical to U.S. interests. The U.S. Army has routinely turned to its general-purpose forces (GPF) and brigade combat teams (BCT) to accomplish these missions; this study will investigate conventional military readiness shortfalls and training challenges due in large part to the overutilization of GPF for SFA purposes. To be sure, the U.S. Army's methods at SFA have evolved over time and have been exceedingly ad hoc in nature--arguably leading to unintended policy outcomes and undermining the Army's war-fighting readiness.